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ABOLISHING IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL STATUTES
Jonathan A. Marcantel*
ABSTRACT
The doctrine of implied rights of action has generated a wealth of scholarship
in two general areas: First, scholars have attempted to generate normatively
justifiable, generally applicable mechanisms to evaluate implied rights of action.
Second, scholars have argued the doctrine should permit private rights of action in
reference to specific statutory schemes. To date, however, no scholar has evaluated
whether the doctrine is normatively justifiable in the first instance. This Article fills
a portion of that gap with three primary arguments. First, this Article argues the
Doctrine itself maintains, at most, nominal beneficial utility, as the Doctrine, as
currently articulated, is only applicable in remote, isolated circumstances. Second,
this Article assesses the costs of maintaining the doctrine using the metrics of both
Administrative Justice Theory and Procedural Justice Theory and argues that
continuing to maintain the doctrine both generates significant administrative waste
and has the potential to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the judicial
system. Finally, this Article assesses the impact that abolition of the doctrine would
have on Corrective Justice Theory and argues that abolition would have a neutral
impact. Ultimately, taking those three arguments together, this Article argues the
Doctrine is not normatively justifiable.
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Legislation does not exist as a normative good unto itself. Rather, the value of
legislation, however efficient or justified, lies primarily in the ability to enforce it.
While scholarly debates regarding Congress' explicit enforcement mechanisms
exist,2 scholars and jurists alike do not seriously debate whether Congress possesses
the ability to explicitly generate enforcement mechanisms in the general sense.3
Furthermore, scholars and jurists alike do not seriously debate whether Congress
should possess the power to explicitly generate enforcement mechanisms in the
general sense; with the exception of only a few contexts, those general positions are
accepted as constitutional postulates. 4 To date, the judiciary's use of the doctrine of
implied rights of action' ("the Doctrine") has received a similar unequivocal
acceptance from both jurists and scholars. Specifically, while the Supreme Court
and scholars have devoted attention to defining the Doctrine,' applying the
Doctrine,' debating the normative justification for using specific factors in the
Doctrine's analysis,' and arguing for extension of the Doctrine into specific
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1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Limiting Suits To Enforce Federal Laws, TRIAL, January 2003, at 71.; see also
Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer's Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and the Creation of Individual
Rights, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 613, 635 (2003) (discussing arguments related to the value of regulations in the
absence of enforcement power).
2. To the extent scholars debate Congress' ability to legislate or enforce legislation, in any area, those
debates are always within the context of whether Congress' attempted actions are within the constraints of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of
Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2006); Carl W. Chamberlin,
Johnny Can't Read 'Cause Jane's Got a Gun: The Effects of Guns in School and Options After Lopez, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 284 (1998-1999). Outside of the constitutional arena, no scholar or jurist
has debated whether Congress can otherwise exercise legislative powers.
3. E.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280* 81 (2001).
4. For instance, jurists and scholars do debate whether particular legislative action is consistent with the
Constitution. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 432* 33 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. An implied private right of action sits in contrast with an explicit private right of action. Explicit
private rights of action exist when a statute provides a congressionally articulated mechanism of enforcement
by private citizens. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) ("Any person injured . . . [by violation of this Act]
may sue in any appropriate United States district court . . ."). Implicit private rights of action exist when
Congress does not articulate a private mechanism of enforcement, but the text, legislative history, legislative
context, or some other factor indicates a congressional intent to create a private right of enforcement. See,
e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 394-95 (1982) (holding an implied
private right of action exists under the Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 688-89 (1979) (holding an implied right of action exists to enforce Title IX).
6. See infra Part IIA-B.
7. See infra Part II.A-B.
8. In terms of discussions between and among jurists, compare Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 23* 24, 32* 33 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing for a return to the Rigsby approach), with Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing in favor of a strict textualist approach). In terms of discussions by scholars, see generally, e.g., Susan
J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights ofAction,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861 (1996) (arguing congressional intent should be one among several factors to
determine whether to imply a private, implied right); see also, e.g., Davant, supra note 1, at 615 (arguing
agency regulations should ordinarily be insufficient to create implied rights); Bradford C. Mank, Legal
252 [Vol. 39:2
2012-13] Abolishing Implied Private Rights ofAction Pursuant to Federal Statutes
statutory schemes,9 no scholar or jurist has explored the normative value of
maintaining the Doctrine in the first instance.o This Article begins that discussion.
Beginning with the positive discussion, Part II of this Article discusses the
tortured historical evolution of the Doctrine in three sections. Section A discusses
the early jurisprudential history of the Doctrine, beginning with the Court's original
approach to the framework in Rigsby" and Borak.12 Section B then discusses the
advent of the Cort" analysis and the Court's inconsistent articulation and
application of Cort's principles over the course of the four years between the
delivery of Cort and the delivery of Cannon. 14 This Section additionally discusses
the delivery of Cannon and the Court's movement from its Cort-based framework
to its textualist-based framework. Section C then discusses the Court's application
of its textualist approach in Touche and Transamerica,'6 with particular emphasis
on the Court's inconsistent articulation and application of its textualist framework.
Finally, this Section discusses the inconsistent manner that the federal courts-
including the Supreme Court-have defined and applied the framework for the past
thirty years.
Part III continues the discussion begun in Part II by explaining the reason for
the inconsistencies in the jurisprudential line and ultimately assesses the nominal
positive benefit of maintaining the Doctrine as it currently exists. Specifically,
Section A argues the inconsistencies in the Doctrine's jurisprudential line are a
result of the Court's enervation of the Doctrine. That is, as the Court moved from
the Rigsby framework to the textualist framework, application of the Doctrine
became more difficult and thus more inconsistent because it was less grounded in
discerning Congress' objective reason for enactment-an analysis grounded, at
least in part, in text-and more focused upon Congress' intent to create an implied
right-an analysis that exists in the absence of text. Using Section A as a
foundation, Section B discusses the continuing utility of the Doctrine as a means of
determining Congress' intent and argues that maintaining the Doctrine preserves a
Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 817-818 (2002)
(arguing legislative context is a valid mechanism for determining congressional intent to create an implied
right).
9. E.g., Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI or Title IX Enforceable in a
Private Right of Action: Does Sandoval or Sullivan Control this Question?, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 47, 52
(2004) (arguing both Titles VI and IX provide implied rights of action for retaliation claims).
10. No scholar has argued for the complete abolition of the Doctrine. One jurist has made a summary
argument for its abolition. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[I]f the current state of the law were to be changed, it should be moved in precisely the opposite
direction-away from our current congressional intent test to the categorical position that federal private
rights of action will not be implied."). And, one jurist has argued to significantly bridle the Doctrine. See,
e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing private rights of action should not be implied
"[albsent the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent"; otherwise, the Doctrine
encroaches upon the separation of powers). But, even those jurists did not explore and weigh the normative
impact of abolition.
11. Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
12. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
13. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
14. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
15. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
16. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
253
Journal ofLegislation
nominal positive benefit in remote, isolated circumstances. Section C then shifts the
focus from the Doctrine itself to one of its primary corollaries-the concept of
legislative context-and argues that the concept of legislative context has minimal
beneficial value, as its applicability is both limited to remote, isolated
circumstances and inherently based upon speculative factual predicates.
Part IV places the nominal value of maintaining the Doctrine discussed in Part
III in juxtaposition with both structural and substantive theory. Specifically,
Section A examines the Doctrine in light of Administrative Justice Theory and
argues the Doctrine substantially encumbers administrative justice by generating
judicial waste. Section B then discusses the Doctrine in light of Procedural Justice
Theory and evaluates the Doctrine's effect using three different cornerstones of the
theory-voice, neutrality, and consistency. This Section argues abolition would
have a neutral impact on voice, as, even if abolition occurred, other avenues of
exercising voice would remain. But, continuing to maintain the Doctrine could
negatively impact both neutrality and consistency because the Doctrine fosters
reasonable perceptions of non-merit-based decision-making. Finally, Section C
evaluates the Doctrine in light of Corrective Justice Theory and argues the Theory
no longer forms a sound normative basis for maintaining the Doctrine for two
reasons: First, the doctrinal purpose underlying contemporary implied-rights
jurisprudence is inconsistent with Corrective Justice Theory. And, second, even
assuming the first were not true, abolition of the Doctrine would have a neutral
impact on the Theory. Taking all of these arguments together, this Article
ultimately argues the Doctrine is not normatively justifiable.
I. THE TORTURED EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
The evolutionary history of the Doctrine is best articulated as a series of three
epochs-the early history, the Cort period, and the modem, textualist period. This
17. This Article does not attempt to assess the Doctrine's value against every bedrock legal theory, as
most are either inapplicable to it or would result in unproductive discussions. Thus, for example, this Article
does not address the Doctrine's impact on Deterrence Theory. At a basic level, Deterrence Theory argues that
humans are rational actors who prospectively evaluate the benefits and penalties associated with their conduct.
E.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544* 55 (2003). Using that as a
postulate, Deterrence Theory then argues there is some optimum penalty whose risk is greater than the
potential benefits achieved by prohibited action. Id. Once identified and set as a counter-balance, that risk
will then deter rational actors from engaging in undesirable conduct as the result of a conscious or
unconscious cost-benefit analysis. Id. While it is reasonable to believe that implied rights, once recognized
and applied by courts, may form a basis for Deterrence Theory to operate, see, e.g., T. James Lee, Jr., Central
Bank v. First Interstate Bank, Plain Language and the Implied Right ofAction Under Section 10(b) and Rule
1Ob-5, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 269, 294 (1995) (arguing the existence of an implied right of action for violations
of Securities Exchange Act provides a deterrent to non-compliance), the question of whether the Doctrine
should continue to exist is not properly evaluated in such a broad manner. Rather, to evaluate the beneficial
value of the Doctrine in light of Deterrence Theory, the inquiry would need to be cabined to one question:
does the possibility that a federal court might imply a private right of action deter parties from violating
federal statutes? While it is certainly possible that actors could be prospectively deterred from prohibited
action on the basis that a court could create an implied right of action for private parties, the argument seems
intuitively fantastical. This is particularly true, given the rarity with which courts recognize new implied
rights. See infra Part IV.A.
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Part follows that basic structure, tracing the growth of the Doctrine from its infancy
in Rigsby to its twilight in the modem era.
A. The Early History of the Doctrine
The early history of implied private rights of action is somewhat like the big
bang-at first there was nothing but within moments a jurisprudential universe
appeared." This early expansion was due to the Supreme Court's broad, summary
review of the issue in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
In Rigsby, the plaintiff worked for the defendant railway company as a switchman,
and in the course of his duties, fell as a result of the railway company's
negligence.1 9  The plaintiff subsequently sued the railway company, alleging
violations of the Federal Safety Appliance Act,20 an Act which provided no explicit
cause of action.21 After a trial on the merits, the district court instructed the jury
that liability existed and then charged the jury to determine damages.22 The circuit
23
court affirmed these instructions. On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed,
holding:
There can be no question . .. that the [statute] was intended for the
especial protection of employees engaged in duties such as that which
24plaintiff was performing . . . '[n every case, where a statute enacts or
prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon
the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the
recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law.'25
Stated differently, under Rigsby, the implication of private causes of action was the
26rule as opposed to the exception, leading to the extension of implied private rights
of action in a variety of areas.2
18. The Court in Rigsby stated that the principles inherent in its ruling date back to much earlier common
law presumptions. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39. This, at least in part, has led some scholars to argue that implied
rights of action under federal statutes existed prior to the Court's holding in Rigsby. Eg., Stabile, supra note
8, at 864 n. 15. This position, however, is inconsistent with statements made by the Court. See Franklin v.
Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66* 67 (1992); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689. Furthermore, the instances
preceding Rigsby wherein the Court hinted at a framework for implied rights of action under federal statutes
were all either provided in dicta, see, e.g., Great N. Ry. v. Otos, 239 U.S. 349, 351- 52 (1915), or were
implied remedies, as opposed to implied rights of action, cases. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
19. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 36.
20. The lawsuit was solely premised upon section 2 of the Act's 1910 amendment, which provided: "All
cars must be equipped with secure sill steps and efficient hand brakes; all cars requiring secure ladders and
secure running boards shall be equipped with such ladders and running boards, and all cars having ladders
shall also be equipped with secure hand holds or grab irons on their roofs at the tops of such ladders." Id. at
37.
21. Id. at 39.
22. Id. at 36.
23. Id. at 37.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 39 (quoting 1 Com. Dig.).
26. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 399 n.5.
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Thereafter, for nearly fifty years, the early jurisprudence for private causes of
action focused on an analysis nearly identical to negligence per se principles extant
in tort.2 That is, the Court's analysis focused solely on two facets: First, was the
statute intended to protect this particular type of plaintiff. And, second, was the
plaintiff injured in a manner envisioned by the statute.29 The Rigsby framework,
however, eventually began to doctrinally erode, moving away from a common law,
negligence per se approach and beginning to focus on Congress' implicit intent o-a
change that presumably correlated with the rise of more sophisticated and complex
31statutory schemes. The first explicit coalescence of that movement was
recognized in the Court's opinion in Borak.
In Borak, a stockholder sued a company, alleging the company violated section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1958), by
distributing false and misleading proxy material.3 The district court dismissed the
complaint, holding that section 27 of the Act provided no private right of action for
violations of section 14(a). Rather, the district court held the sole remedy for
violations of section 14(a) was declaratory relief.3 4  The court of appeals
subsequently reversed, holding an implicit private right of action for remedial relief
existed."
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed. Basing its reasoning on the "broad
remedial purposes" of the statutory scheme, the Court held that private rights of
action were a "necessary supplement to [agency] action . .. and indeed a "most
effective weapon in the enforcement" of the statutory scheme. 38 Thus, the Court
held that in such circumstances, "it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."39
27. See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960); Tunstall v. Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944).
28. See Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate Impact Suits, 34 GA. L. REv. 1155,
1227* 28 (2000). Instances do exist wherein the Court strayed from this framework during the period. E.g.,
T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 474* 75 (1959). Those instances, however, were isolated and
were uniformly premised upon the existence of a comprehensive administrative scheme. See, e.g., Calhoon v.
Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 141 (1964); T.IME., 359 U.S. at 470* 71.
29. Compare Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 38-40 (stating the test for implying rights of action), with Powell v.
Keeley, 795 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (stating the test for the application of negligence per se
principles), and Fagan v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 198, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating the
same).
30. Lambert, supra note 28, at 1228* 29.
31. Id. Notwithstanding what can be perceived-retrospectively-as contraction, the Court only denied
extension of private causes of action in a small number of cases. And, even then, those cases nearly uniformly
involved statutes with comprehensive administrative procedures that did not contemplate any judicial review.
E.g., TIME., 359 U.S. at 469.
32. Borak, 377 U.S. at 427.
33. Id. at 427* 28.
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 431.
36. Id. at 435.
37. Id. at 431- 432.
38. Id. at 432.
39. Id. at 433.
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While the framework flowing from Borak doctrinally cabined the holding in
40
Rigsby, the application of Borak's principles did not yield a contraction in the
extension of private rights of action. Rather, the application yielded an equally
expansive result in both the Supreme Court41 and the circuit courts.42 Nevertheless,
the Borak framework formed an integral step towards the Court's current textualist
framework, as it, for the first time, focused its attention on achieving Congress'
43purposes.
B. The Advent of Cort Analysis and the Movement towards a Singularity
The Borak holding maintained precedential value until the Supreme Court's
decision in Cort v. Ash.44 In Cort, the Supreme Court created a four-part analytical
scheme to determine whether a private right of action exists under a federal
statute. 45  First, the scheme required courts to determine whether the plaintiff is
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." 46 Second, the
courts were required to discern whether Congress had indicated-either explicitly
or implicitly-its intent to extend or deny a private right of action.47  Third, the
courts were required to determine whether implication of a private right of action
was consistent with the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme. 48 Finally, the
courts were required to determine whether the action was the type traditionally
relegated to the states. 49  The confusion that exists regarding the framework for
implied-rights cases stems from this holding.
Although the Cort factors test initially appeared to state a concise framework
for evaluating implied-rights cases, the framework created more questions than
answers. For instance, the Court's articulation did not indicate whether each of the
factors would be required or whether one factor may weight more heavily than
others-thus permitting the absence of one or more factors if one factor was
40. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 42.
41. E.g., Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381* 83 (1970); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396
U.S. 229, 235* 40 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414. 15 (1968). Notwithstanding this trend, the Court did deny the extension in a small
number of cases during the period. Nevertheless, the statutory schemes in those cases nearly uniformly
included comprehensive administrative processes for redress and no provisions for judicial review. E.g., Sec.
Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420* 24 (1975).
42. E.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 (2nd Cir. 1971); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373
(1st Cir. 1971); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 803* 04 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431* 33.
44. Cort, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (unanimous). The Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule Borak in Cort.
Nevertheless, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has stated that Cort effectively overruled Borak-in
terms of the analytical framework. E.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287; see also, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 39. 41 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
45. While Cort is widely accepted as an attempt to constrain the implication of private rights of action,
the decision did not have that effect in the lower courts. Mank, supra note 9, at 63-64, 65. Rather, between
1975 and 1979, the federal appellate courts recognized implied private rights of action in at least twenty cases.
Id. at 64.
46. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39).
47. Id.; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 38 (1977).




particularly strong. Questions of that nature were further exacerbated by the
Court's inconsistent application of the principles. For instance, not even one year
after delivering the opinion in Cort, and at its first opportunity to apply the
framework, the Supreme Court already began to stray from the framework. In
Ernst & Ernst,so the Court was confronted with the question whether scienter was a
required element of a cause of action pursuant to Rule 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act." In reaching its holding, the Court did not mention the Cort
framework.52 Furthermore, the Court relied solely on statutory text to reach its
conclusion, subsequently bolstered its conclusion with legislative history, only
addressed the purposes of the statutory scheme in a rebuttal argument, and failed to
mention regulation by the states entirely." Although it could fairly be said that the
Court's divergence from the Cort framework was a reaction to the nature of the
claim-the claim was to discern the elements of an existing implied right of action
as opposed to discerning whether an implied right existed in the first instance-the
case does not stand alone in this regard. Rather, Ernst & Ernst represents the
beginning of a trend wherein the Court failed to apply Cort analysis both in
circumstances where the Court was reviewing attempted extensions of existing
rights and the actual creation of new rights.
Two years after delivering its opinion in Cort, the Supreme Court first
discussed the Cort analysis in Chris-Craft.5 4 But rather than solidifying the Cort
framework by applying it, the Court in Chris-Craft only addressed the Cort factors
as a means of bolstering its holding. In Chris-Craft, the Court, again interpreting
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, held that a tender offeror did not have a
private right of action pursuant to section 14(e)." In reaching that holding, the
Court premised its analysis on a combination of legislative history and a discussion
of whether implication would effectuate Congress' remedial purposes-principles
from both Cort and Borak. Only as an afterthought and only after reaching its
conclusion did the Court mention or explicitly apply the Cort framework."
The confusion created by Chris-Craft was then compounded in Santa Fe." Just
as with Chris-Craft, the Court in Santa Fe was addressing the Securities Exchange
Act. Specifically, the Court was tasked with determining whether Section 10(b)
and regulation lOb-5 prohibited acts short of manipulation or deception." The
Court held they did not, premising its holding solely on the statutory language.
After reaching its holding, the Court then bolstered its decision by discussing the
third factor of Cort-the effectuation of Congress' intent-and the fourth Cort
factor-regulation by the states." Thus, in a light most favorable to the Cort
50. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
51. Id. at 193.
52. See generally id.
53. Id. at 194* 210.
54. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 37-41.
55. Id. at 35.
56. Id. at 37* 41.
57. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
58. Id. at 472* 74.
59. Id. at 477* 78.
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precedent, it appeared that Cort analysis, while perhaps controlling in some
contexts, was perhaps not controlling in suits pursuant to the Securities Exchange
Act. This potential pattern, however, was destroyed one year later when the Court
61
issued its opinion in Brown.
In Brown, the Court addressed whether the disclosure provisions in the
Freedom of Information Act provided a private right of action. The Court held they
did not, premising its decision, in conformance with Santa Fe, solely upon the text
of the statute. After reaching its holding, the Court then addressed legislative
62
history to bolster its decision. While the Cort decision is mentioned twice in the
opinion, the framework is not articulated in its substance, is not stated as
controlling, and is not applied. The Brown opinion is instructive for two reasons:
First, as mentioned a moment ago, it demonstrated that the Court's reluctance to
apply the Cort framework was not limited to actions pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act. Second, it demonstrated that the Court's reluctance to apply the
Cort framework was not premised upon the distinction between analyzing the
extension of previously implied rights and implying rights in the first instance.4
Rather, on the heels of Brown, it appeared a new pattern was perhaps emerging-
taking Ernst & Ernst and Brown together, it appeared the primary consideration for
implying private rights would be the statutory text. But, that pattern still left a piece
of the puzzle missing-the Court's holding in Chris-Craft.
Four years after delivering the opinion in Cort, the Court delivered its opinion
in Cannon 61-both the first and the last time the Court would both state the
framework in Cort as controlling and apply all of its factors. In Cannon, the
plaintiff, a female, sued the University of Chicago, alleging she was denied
admission to medical school on the basis of her gender in violation of section 901
61of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1682 (1976).
The district court subsequently granted the University of Chicago's motion to
dismiss, holding that section 901 did not provide either an explicit or implicit
private right of action. The court of appeals thereafter affirmed on similar
60. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
61. Id. at 291* 92.
62. Id. at 293* 94.
63. Id. at 284, 316.
64. Compare Ernst & Ernst at 194, with Brown, 441 U.S. at 281-82.
65. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
66. Following Cannon, the Court never applied all four factors of the Cort analysis to any case before it.
See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 183, 186 n.4 (1988) (wherein the Court reached its
conclusion based on the purposes of the statute, and subsequently "reinforce[ed] [its] conclusion" using
statutory text and legislative history, and briefly discussed the fourth Cort factor in a rebuttal footnote); see
also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536* 41 (1984) (concluding no congressional intent
existed to support a private right based on legislative history and then buttressing that conclusion using the
remaining three Cort factors).
67. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680. In pertinent part, section 901 of Title IX provides: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . .
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
68. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1259, 1260 (1976).
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grounds." Additionally, the court of appeals held that the administrative grievance
procedure contained within Title IX was the exclusive means of enforcing its
provisions. 0
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed," basing its decision on the four
factors originally outlined in Cort. Referring to the first Cort factor, the Court-for
the first time-stated that the analysis centered around the existence of "right- or
duty-creating language." 72 Right- or duty-creating language, the Court stated, must
focus upon a particular, identifiable class of beneficiaries as opposed to stating a
general prohibition or providing for protection of the general public." Thus, the
Court held that it has historically been willing to extend implied private rights of
action in circumstances wherein the language of the statute either created a specific
right for a particular person (right-creating languafe) or provided a particular
prohibition against conduct (duty-creating language). Applying this framework to
Title IX, the Court held Title IX explicitly conferred a benefit upon a class of
persons of whom the plaintiff was a part-all people who are discriminated against
on the basis of gender in an educational program or a program receiving federal
financial assistance.
Referring to the second Cort factor, the Court stated that the analysis is
governed by the existence of legislative history indicating Congress intended to
either extend or deny private rights of action." That having been said, the Court
stated, "[i]n situations . . . 'in which it is clear that federal law has granted a class of
persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private
cause of action [in the legislative history] . . . .'"" But, an intention to restrict a
private right of action will nevertheless be controlling. In the context of Title IX,
the Court held the legislative history unambiguously indicated an intent to extend a
private right of action. The Court premised this conclusion on two primary
grounds. First, the Court held that the legislative context indicated a congressional
intent to extend private rights of action." Specifically, the Court noted that prior to
the passage of Title IX, the federal courts had previously found that Title VI created
an implied private right of action.so The Court then analyzed legislative history
69. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1071* 75 (1976).
70. Id. at 1072-73.
71. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
72. Id. at 690 n.13.
73. See id. at 690* 93.
74. See id. at 690 n.13 (citations omitted). In support of this position, the Court stated, "the right- or
duty-creating language of the statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of
implication of a cause of action. With the exception of one case, in which the relevant statute reflected a
special policy against judicial interference, this Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the
language of the statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in
the case." Id. (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 694.
76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 82 (emphasis in original).
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 696 & n.21, 98 (citing Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.
1967)) (other citations omitted).
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from floor debates, House reports, and Senate reports that indicated
congresspersons believed the language in Title IX was "identical" to the language
in Title VI, with only minor exceptions not relevant to the inquiry." Thus, the
Court, invoking its policy of assuming legislative actors are aware of judicial
interpretations of existing statutory law, held that Congress' use of "identical"
language indicated its intent to achieve-or at least acquiescence in-an identical
result.82 Second, the Court held that the general statutory scheme for providing
attorneys' fees in a companion section, combined with the legislative history of that
companion section, explicitly presumed the existence of an implied right of action."
Specifically, after reviewing floor debates and Senate reports, the Court held a clear
presumption existed that congresspersons believed the companion section would
entitle persons to pursue remedies. 84
In terms of the evolution of the jurisprudential line, Cannon added three
measures: First, Cannon added the right- or duty-creating analysis-a measure that
would forever change the line. Second, the Court limited its analysis of the second
Cort factor to legislative history-a measure that would also change the line.
Finally, the Court destroyed any perceived pattern that could be garnered from the
combination of Ernst & Ernst and Brown-at least the pattern the Court seemed to
create before it issued its holding in Cannon. As to the first and second measures,
although Cannon's statement of the first Cort factor is consistent with Cort's initial
articulation, Cannon 's attempt to form a unifying principle for the jurisprudential
line with the concept of right- or duty-creating language created a confusion
between the first and second Cort factors that both expanded the first Cort factor
and narrowed the second Cort factor. Specifically, the right- or duty-creating
analysis would ultimately become a mechanism to focus the Court's attention to
Congress' intent to both benefit a class of beneficiaries and create a private right-
the latter of which was, at least pursuant to Cort, reserved for the second Cort
factor. Furthermore, and in a similar vein, the right- or duty-creating analysis
would relegate the second Cort factor to a mere discussion of legislative history, a
result consistent with the analysis provided in Cannon of that factor but inconsistent
with Cort's articulation of discerning Congress' "explicit or implicit" intent to
create a private right. As to the final measure, the Court's opinion in Cannon, in
combination with the opinions in Ernst & Ernst and Brown, demonstrated a unified
pattern for the Court's use of the Cort framework-the Court used the framework
in cases where it implied private rights of action and did not use the framework in
cases where it declined to extend a private right." Framed slightly differently,
when the Court could dispositively determine Congress' intent to not extend a right
81. See id. at 695* 96 & n.19.
82. See id. at 696-98.
83. See id. at 699* 700 (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 703. The Court did analyze the remaining two Cort factors; nevertheless, the Court's
analysis of those factors is not relevant to the inquiry here. See id. at 703-709.
85. This portion of the pattern holds true for Chris-Craft as well. See Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 37-
41 (citations omitted). But, the Court did not rely on statutory text when issuing its decision in Chris-Craft.
See id. at 24-25 (citations omitted). Thus, the opinion remains an outlier in terms of demonstrating the
Court's patterns for decision-making during this period.
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by resorting to the statutory text alone, the Court declined to address the Cort
principles as a mechanism of reaching its decision. That pattern, nascent as it may
be, ultimately became the foundation for the Court's textualist articulation in
Touche."
C. The Doctrinal Coalescence of Textualism and
the Inconsistent Remnants of Cort
In Touche, the Court addressed whether Section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act created a private right of action." The Court held it did not,
premising its decision solely on the statutory text. Specifically, the Court held that
in cases where it has been inclined to extend implied rights of action, "the statute in
question at least prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor of
private parties."" Section 17(a), the Court held, did neither. Rather, Section 17(a)
"d[id] not by any stretch of its language purport to confer private damages rights or,
indeed, any remedy. . . ." Thus, "[i]n short, there [wa]s no basis in the language
of § 17(a) for inferring that a civil cause of action for damages lay in favor of
anyone."90 After reaching its decision, the Court then addressed the absence of
legislative history in a rebuttal argument.91 In that regard, the Court held that the
legislative record was "silent" on whether Congress intended to extend a private
right of action.9 Finally, in response to a rebuttal argument, the Court held that
analysis of the remaining two Cort factors was unnecessary where, as here,
congressional intent could be gleaned from the statutory language.93
The Court's opinion in Touche served to solidify the Court's evolving
jurisprudence for five reasons. First, the opinion solidified the Court's articulation
of the central inquiry it had begun to fashion in Ernst & Ernst9 4 and Brown."
Specifically, the Court held the central inquiry is "one of statutory construction"
and thus the Court's "task is limited solely to determining whether Congress
intended to create the private right of action."96 In that vein, as with Ernst & Ernst
97and Brown, the Court's holding did not extend beyond the statutory text. Second,
and again consistent with the Court's holdings in Ernst & Ernst and Brown, the
Court solidified its position that analyzing that central inquiry did not require a full
Cort analysis. Rather, the Court held that where review of the statutory text did not
yield a congressional intent to extend a private right of action, analysis of the
86. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
87. See id. at 562 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 569.
89. Id. at 570.
90. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 575.
94. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185.
95. Brown, 441 U.S. 281.
96. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568.
97. Compare id. at 575-76, with Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 200-201, and Brown, 441 U.S. at 291* 94.
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remaining Cort factors was unnecessary. Third, the Court solidified the use of the
right- or duty-creating analysis expressed in Cannon as a mechanism to determine
the existence or non-existence of congressional intent. 9 And, more importantly, the
Court used that right- or duty-creating analysis in a manner consistent with Cannon.
The Court read the right- or duty-creating language test as encompassing not only
the "especial benefit" test encompassed in Cort's first factor but also an "intent to
create a private right" test that, according to Cort, should have been allocated to the
second factor.10 Fourth, in conformance with Cannon, the Court's analysis
relegated the second Cort factor-legislative intent-to a mere discussion of
legislative history.'o' Finally, it appeared the pattern that emerged from Ernst &
Ernst, Brown, and Cannon was correct-the Court did not analyze all of the Cort
factors when it declined to extend a private right of action but did analyze each of
them when it did extend a private right. The analytical consistencies from Touche,
however, would not all survive long. Rather, several months following Touche, the
Court delivered its opinion in Transamerica.'02
In Transamerica, the Court addressed whether the Investment Advisors Act of
1940103 provided a private right of action. The Court held that it did provide a
limited right of action for an equitable remedy for rescission, basing its opinion, yet
again, solely on the statutory text.10o In reaching that holding, the Court did not
indicate the Cort framework was controlling, did not explicitly mention the
"especial benefit" factor, and did not mention the right- or duty-creating analysis. o0
Rather, the Court summarily stated: "It is apparent that the two sections were
intended to benefit" those similarly situated to the plaintiff.' Furthermore, again
summarily, the Court stated that the legislative history supported that conclusion.
But, the Court stated, the inquiry could not end there. Rather, the Court still needed
to determine whether Congress intended that the benefit would be enforceable in
private litigation-an issue on which the Court held the legislative history was
"entirely silent."'o The Court thus returned to the statutory language and held the
language alone implicitly intended to create a private right.
After holding a limited private right for an equitable remedy existed, the Court
then confronted the question whether a private claim for damages existed. On that
question, the Court held a private right for damages did not exist.'o9 The Court
began its analysis by stating that the statutory scheme explicitly provided both
judicial and administrative remedies. Thus, the Court invoked the statutory
98. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-576.
99. See id. at 569.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 569-71.
102. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -20 (1976).
104. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 12-13.
105. See id. at 18-19.
106. See id. at 15-19.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 18.
109. See id. at 24.
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construction principle that where Congress provides a specific remedy, "it includes
the negative of any other" remedy."o That statutory construction principle,
however, could yield, where a contrary legislative intent can be found.'I To
discern the legislative intent, the Court reviewed the statutory text of the Act,
previously enacted versions of the Act, previously un-enacted versions of the Act,
and companion legislation. Based upon that evidence, the Court held no private
right for damages existed.112 Notably, the Court did not use the right- or duty-
creating analysis the Court found dispositive in Touche" and arguably Cannon."14
Furthermore, the Court did not provide the Cort framework as controlling
authority."' Rather, the Court only referenced the framework in a rebuttal
argument.
While the Court's holdings in Transamerica are consistent with the holdings in
Touche, Transamerica's analytical structure regarding the application of the first
and second Cort factors is inconsistent with the analytical structure in Touche.
Furthermore, Transamerica's analytical structure is inconsistent with the pattern
formed by Ernst & Ernst,"' Brown,"8 and Cannon."'
As to the first inconsistency, while initially appearing identical to the analysis
in Touche and consistent with the analysis in Cannon, Transamerica's analysis, at
least as ultimately informed by the language in the Court's rebuttal, is structured
much more closely to the framework initially espoused in Cort. Specifically, in
Cort, the first two factors were delineated as follows: First, a court should
determine if the statute benefitted an especial class.120 Second, a court should
determine whether Congress intended-either explicitly or implicitly-to create a
private right of enforcement. When Transamerica's analysis is combined with
the Court's rebuttal discussion, it appears that is what the Court did. In its analysis,
the Court first began by noting that the statute was intended to benefit a specific
class of persons.122 The Court then used indicia of legislative intent to determine
whether Congress intended to create a private right. And, the Court analyzed both
of these factors-separately-without mentioning the right- or duty-creating
language test.123 Although the Court's analysis does not explicitly indicate it is
using the Cort framework, as the Court does not mention the framework in its
110. Id. at 20 (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 20-22, 24.
113. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569* 71.
114. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690* 94.
115. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76).
116. Compare Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569* 71, with Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19-24.
117. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 194-97.
118. See Brown, 441 U.S. at 291- 94.
119. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690* 93.
120. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
121. Id.
122. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 17.
123. See id. at 17-18.
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primary analysis,124 the Court's rebuttal confirmed that it was in fact using the first
two Cort factors in its primary analysis by indicating that it need not review the
other two Cort factors-the third and fourth factors.' This structure stands in
contrast to the structure espoused-not even one year earlier-in Touche, as the
Court did not use the right- or duty-creating language and did not combine the first
and second Cort factors.126
As to the second inconsistency, while the Court found that a private right of
action existed for equitable remedies, the Court did not mention the Cort
framework and did not apply at least two of the Cort factors.'27 Rather, the Court
clearly referred to the first Cort factor-the especial benefit factor-albeit
summarily, indicated no legislative history existed, and then proceeded to find the
implied right within the statutory text itself. Thus, Transamerica's analysis broke
the pattern that was previously developing in Ernst & Ernst, Brown, and Cannon.
That is, on previous occasions, while the Court did not apply the full Cort analysis
when it declined to extend private rights, 12 the Court did apply the full Cort
analysis in the circumstance where it did extend a private right. 30 In Transamerica,
the Court both extended a private right in one circumstance and withheld a private
right in another."' Nevertheless, the Court did not apply a full Cort analysis to
either situation.132
Taken together, the history of the Court's articulation of the test from 1975 to
1979 presented two primary inconsistencies that both plagued the jurisprudence
during that period and would continue to plague the jurisprudence in the future.
First, the Court inconsistently indicated the relevance and weight of the Cort
factors.13 Second, even within the first two Cort factors, the Court failed to
consistently apply them; rather, the Court would occasionally blend the analysis
between the first and second Cort factors.134
In the period following Transamerica, the two inconsistencies grew. As to the
first inconsistency, the Court, in some contexts, would indicate the Cort factors
124. See id. at 15-22.
125. Id. at 23-24 (quoting Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76).
126. Compare Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569, 576 (noting significance of right- or duty-creating analysis
and later including within that analysis the "especial benefit" test and the "intent to create a private right"
test), with Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15-22 (separating "especial benefit" test from "intent to create a private
right" test and eschewing right- or duty-creating analysis).
127. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15-19.
128. See id. at 17-18.
129. See, e.g., Brown, 441 U.S. at 291* 94.
130. See, e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689-709.
131. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24.
132. See id. at 15-25.
133. Compare Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688 & n.9 (holding the four Cort factors are relevant), with Brown,
441 U.S. at 291* 94 (not applying the Cort factors), and Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. at 37* 41 (only using the
Cort factors to bolster its decision).
134. Compare Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569, 576 (noting significance of right- or duty-creating analysis
and later including within that analysis the "especial benefit" test and the "intent to create a private right"
test), with Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15-22 (separating "especial benefit" test from "intent to create a private
right" test and eschewing rights- or duty-creating language).
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were merely instructive and then apply one or more factors. 5  In still other
contexts, the Court would not indicate that the Cort framework was controlling but
would nonetheless apply at least some of the factors.13 Finally, some members of
the Court believe Cort was effectively overruled.' As to the second inconsistency,
when the Court was applying the first two Cort factors, the Court inconsistently
applied them, with some cases following the right- or duty-approach espoused by
Cannon and Touche,"' some cases following the approach from Cort and
Transamerica,I" and some cases not specifically addressing either approach.140
These inconsistencies in the Court's jurisprudence are mirrored in the lower
federal courts. Thus, for instance, as to the first inconsistency, some federal circuit
courts apply the full Cort framework to implication cases.141 Other federal circuit
courts do not mention Cort when ruling on implication questions.142  Still other
federal circuit courts mention the Cort framework but indicate it has been
effectively overruled.143 Furthermore, as to the second inconsistency, some federal
circuit courts apply the rights-creating language test espoused in Cannon and
Touche,'4 while other federal circuit courts apply the traditional test espoused in
Cort and Transamerica.145 Thus, at least since 1979, the positive law for implied-
rights cases has been doctrinally inconsistent both in articulation and application.
II. THE CURRENT BENEFICIAL VALUE OF THE DOCTRINE
Inconsistency within the positive law, without more, would be a weak
normative justification for abolishing an entire legal Doctrine-particularly one
with a now deeply entrenched history. But, while we can certainly discuss the
135. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers
Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91-95 (1981); Univs. Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981).
136. See, e.g., Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Emps., 489 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1989); Thompson, 484
U.S. at 180-86; Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 13-15.
137. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring).
138. E.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282-83 (2002); Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-72; see also, e.g.,
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89 (using the right-creating language from Cannon).
139. E.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534-36 (1984); Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91-95.
140. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 482-85 (2008); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553
U.S. 442, 452-57 (2008).
141. See, e.g., Miller v. Chase Home Fin., 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (llth Cir. 2012).
142. See, e.g., Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593 (2nd Cir. 2011).
143. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Although Cort has never
been formally overruled, subsequent decisions have altered it virtually beyond recognition."); Love v. Delta
Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2002) (indicating the Supreme Court has moved away from the
four-factor Cort analysis and now focuses only on legislative intent); Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc.,
236 F.3d 299, 308 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating the Court has "refined" its inquiry); Mallet v. Wis. Div. of
Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating the Supreme Court has "retreated" from Cort
analysis); Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating the Supreme Court has
"refined" Cort analysis); Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins., 966 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating
the Court has "shifted" or "refocused" its analysis from all four factors to simply one); Roberts v. Wamser,
883 F.2d 617, 623 n.17 (8th Cir. 1989) (questioning the continuing "validity" of Cort); see also Thompson,
484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Cort analysis was "effectively overruled").
144. See, e.g., Wisniewski, 510 F.3d at 301-02; Northstar Fin. Advisors v. Schwab Invs., 615 F.3d 1106,
1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
145. See, e.g., McCulloch v. PNC Bank, Inc., 298 F.3d 1217, 1221-25 (llth Cir. 2002).
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negative ramifications of maintaining the Doctrine-and I will-the inconsistencies
within the positive law of the Doctrine, in combination with what substantively
remains of the Doctrine, do serve as an effective mechanism of highlighting the
chief problem with the Doctrine-the Doctrine is substantively empty.
A. The Tortured Evolution Redux: An Explanation
As discussed in Part II, when the Doctrine was initially formulated, the impetus
146
for its existence was the inherent judicial power of the courts. More specifically,
the inquiry was simply: (1) did a federal statute prohibit the defendant's alleged
conduct; (2) did the defendant engage in the conduct to the harm or detriment of the
plaintiff; and (3) was the plaintiff harmed in a manner that the statute sought to
prevent or deter?l 47 Notably, that three-question inquiry only involved two legal
questions-did the federal statute prohibit the defendant's alleged conduct and was
the plaintiff harmed in the manner that the statute sought to prevent or deter?148
And, responding to both of those legal questions revolved around either analyzing
or interpreting actual statutory text or actual language within the legislative history.
That is, when attempting to discern whether the alleged conduct was prohibited, the
courts would look to the actual text of the statute and perhaps interpret the actual
words within the text. 149 Or, when attempting to discern what harms Congress was
attempting to prevent or deter, the courts looked to what was actually recorded
within the legislative history.' Stated differently, there was never a situation where
Congress enacted a statute but said absolutely nothing-in the statute itself or in the
legislative history-about what it was attempting to achieve. Thus, both inquiries
were grounded in objective, written text. Any remaining inquiry was then resolved
simply by announcing the postulate that underlies the Rigsby approach: The
constitutional role of the courts is to right wrongs. Thus, all wrongs have a
remedy.15 And, designing that remedy is within the inherent power of the federal
courts." Accordingly, no additional inquiry was necessary to determine whether a
private right of action did or should exist.
As the Doctrine grew, and most importantly as the Court attempted to cabin the
Doctrine, application became more difficult and thus more inconsistent because it
became less grounded in discerning Congress' reason for enactment-an analysis
grounded, at least in part, in text-and more focused upon Congress' intent to
create an implied right-an analysis that inherently exists in the absence of text.
Thus, under the Court's Borak approach, the federal courts were no longer charged
146. See Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 37* 40.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
interpretation of a statute is a question of law).
149. E.g., Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 37* 38.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 201 (1933) (using legislative
history to determine Congress' purposes for enactment).





with a purely textual inquiry. Instead, the federal courts were charged with a
modified textual inquiry. Specifically, the Borak approach required responses to all
of the analytical questions from the Rigsby approach, with one fundamental change:
The Court would no longer generate an implied right on the basis of its inherent
powers.15 Instead, the Court would look to whether implying a right would
effectuate Congress' intent.
Attempting to effectuate Congress' intent requires resolving two related
inquires: what did Congress hope to achieve, and would implying a right of action
assist in achieving that purpose?l5 As to the former, it at first seems as though the
question does not require a shift from the textual inquiry discussed under the Rigsby
approach. That is, under Rigsby, the courts were charged with discerning what
Congress was attempting to achieve.' And, under the first Borak question, the
courts were attempting to discern what Congress was attempting to achieve.' The
similarity of language, however, can be deceptive. In practice, the initial Borak
question could take two different personalities. First, the Court could analytically
look to what the goals or purposes of Congress were. Under this personality, the
inquiry was identical to the Rigsby inquiry. But, second, the Court could
analytically look to whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.
That personality of course was vastly different from the Rigsby approach-an
approach that did not seek congressional sanction for generating an implied right.
As to the second Borak inquiry, the inquiry inherently seeks a subjective-as
opposed to an objective-value. Under Rigsby, the Court was attempting to discern
what a reasonable reader could glean from the statutory text and legislative
history. That is, it was seeking to discern what a reasonable person would believe
the written words meant; the Court was certainly seeking to determine
congressional intent, but it was doing so using objective tests, and it was doing so
using written words. The second Borak inquiry added a subjective component to
the otherwise purely objective analysis because the inquiry no longer hinged purely
on what a reasonable person would believe the statutory text and legislative history
actually meant. Instead, the inquiry focused on, from a policy perspective, whether
the Court believed permitting a private right of action was either necessary or
desirable to effectuate Congress' goal.'
As a practical matter, when these two Borak inquiries were coupled, the Borak
inquiry began leaning toward an inquiry of whether Congress intended to create an
implied right. That movement then coalesced into the Cort framework-an inquiry
that largely seeks to determine Congress' intent to create an implied right." And,
of course, Cort ultimately gave way to pure textualism-an inquiry that, at least in
154. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433* 35.
155. Id. at 433.
156. See, e.g., id. at 432-33.
157. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 37* 40.
158. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433* 35.
159. See Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 37-39.
160. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433-55.
161. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. While perhaps unfaithful to the language of Cort, the Court has described the
Cort framework as consistent with the textualist framework. See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575* 76.
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articulation, seeks solely to discern Congress' intent to create an implied right. 16 2
As was shown in Part II, the inconsistencies that arose in the Court's jurisprudence
temporally coincide with this shift.16
B. A Doctrine to Serve Remote, Isolated Possibilities
At a fundamental level, the problem with the intent-based inquiry-and the
reason it will inherently give birth to inconsistencies in the positive law-is that it
attempts to discern that which cannot be gathered-Congress' intent in the
complete absence of text. Admittedly, that blanket statement at first seems too
broad. That is, the constitutional job of the judiciary is to interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions.'6 In many circumstances, an intent-based inquiry is
necessary. While this is of course true, as was discussed above, a fundamental
distinction exists between attempting to discern Congress' intent for the purpose of
interpreting a statutory provision and interpreting Congress' intent in the context of
implying rights of action.
In the most common statutory interpretation case, courts are faced with the
meaning of a word or phrase.16 The question surrounding that meaning is
analytically then susceptible to a variety of mechanisms to resolve the inquiry.
Thus, for instance, the Court may look to the meaning of the target word in other
places within the same statutory scheme or in contemporary dictionaries.167 And,
while the Court may in fact look to a number of other mechanisms that are extrinsic
to the text to ultimately determine Congress' intent, the Court nonetheless can
always begin with the text. In contrast, in the most common implied-right case, that
scenario only exists in the hypothetical sense. That is, the situations in which the
Court has confronted whether to extend an implied right of action do not dangle on
what a single word or phrase means.' Rather, they inherently hang on the absence
162. See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76.
163. See supra Part II.
164. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III.
165. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586 (2004) (interpreting the
meaning of the word "age"). It is, of course, true that other statutory interpretation questions seek to have the
Court decide questions in the absence of statutory text. These situations, however, serve to further the point,
as the presumption in these situations will be that Congress attempted to do nothing. For example, the
analysis in a preemption case is similar to that of implied-rights jurisprudence. That is, "the purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case." Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
Furthermore, "Congress may indicate preemptive intent through a statute's express language or through its
structure and purpose." Id. But, "[w]hen addressing questions of express or implied preemption, [the court
begins its] analysis 'with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id. at 77. Thus,
the lack of affirmative evidence indicating an intent to preempt will result in a negative preemption analysis.
166. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 573. 74 (2007).
167. See, e.g., Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Urlich, LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1614 (2010).
168. See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569* 71. Notwithstanding this, the Court has, on one occasion,
facially interpreted text as the analytical basis for implying a private right of action. In Transamerica Morig.,
the Court held that language within the statutory scheme declaring certain contracts "void" "necessarily
contemplate[d]" . . . litigation somewhere." Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18. The Court reasoned that use of the
word "void" must have intended to, at a minimum, permit use of the statutory phrasing as a defense to
contract enforcement. Id. And, once it was available as a defense, it was ordinarily permissible as a sword in
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of such issues. More specifically, while it is certainly possible that a statutory
scheme could for instance provide for attorneys' fees but say nothing expressly
about a cause of action, 6 1 that is not the circumstance the courts confront. Rather,
the courts confront situations where the statutory scheme says nothing about the
existence of a right of action and says nothing about ancillary matters that explicitly
contemplate private litigation."o That then leaves the courts to attempt to create
some mechanism to divine congressional intent through written silence. Or, in
keeping with the preceding discussion, it leaves the courts to determine
congressional intent to create an implied right in the absence of any written text.
This is inherently an exercise in the impossible.
As the test is currently articulated,' the courts may use a number of
mechanisms to determine congressional intent. But, in the first instance,
congressional intent must arise from the statutory text itself.172  That articulation
creates a perfect circle. That is, inherently, in any hypothetical, we would have to
assume no explicit right of action exists within the statutory text; otherwise an
implication analysis would be unnecessary. So, assuming no explicit right exists,
the courts would then look to discern if Congress nonetheless intended to create an
implied right. To determine if Congress intended to create an implied right, the
courts must first look to the statutory text. And, if the statutory text does not
indicate congressional intent, then the inquiry ends.174 That effectively leaves us
with a doctrine of no substance.77 And, even assuming the court would stray from
an action for rescission. Id. While it is not necessarily applicable to the point made in this Section, it is
interesting to note that the Court failed to articulate what, if anything, separated the language in Transamerica
from the language in any general criminal statute. In general, criminal statutes will not give rise to implied
rights of action. See, e.g., Cen. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
190 (1994). And, as a general matter, contracts made in contravention of law are void ab initio. See, e.g.,
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 27 (1948); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and
Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 612* 17 (2009) (discussing the public policy exception). One is thus left to wonder how
relevant the use of the word "void" could be within a statutory scheme that otherwise reads as a commonplace
criminal prohibition. Nevertheless, this isolated example exists.
169. In one isolated situation, something similar to this has occurred. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 686-687.
In Cannon, the Court construed Title IX as providing an implied right of action pursuant to the Cort
framework. Id.
170. See, e.g., Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18.
171. To the extent it could be argued that the Court should return to a test more akin to either the Rigsby or
Borak approach-and thus presumably resolve this criticism-this Article discusses that possibility in Part IV,
Section B.
172. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286* 87.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. During a period when the Court's statement of textualism was less firm, a majority of the Court
recognized that requiring affirmative evidence of congressional intent within the statutory text renders the
Doctrine a "dead letter." Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 ("Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that
we require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the creation of a
private cause of action. The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual dead letter were it limited to
correcting drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify its evident intention to provide a cause of
action."). Nevertheless, later statements by the Court indicate this language was foreshadowing. See, e.g.,
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286* 87 ("Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal
law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this
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the text into legislative history in an attempt to discern congressional intent, the
inquiry is only functional in the negative.
At least in the hypothetical sense, legislative history is only useful in situations
where Congress does not explicitly provide for rights of action in the statutory text
but nonetheless discusses their usefulness, or lack thereof, in the legislative sessions
that preceded enactment. Assuming, for purposes of the argument, that discussions
had during legislative sessions are representative of "Congress' intent"-an
assumption many would not make 1-the argument still only bears merit in the
negative. That is, legislative discussions could be useful to the extent the history
explicitly indicates Congress did not intend to create a right of action; those
discussions would in fact explain the absence of explicit provisions within the text.
But, it is-at best-unlikely that Congress would have affirmatively intended to
create an implied right, as explicitly indicated in the legislative history, but
nonetheless failed to enact statutory language to that effect. Undoubtedly, it is
possible to generate hypotheticals wherein this exact scenario comes to pass. And,
those scenarios are undoubtedly possible. For instance, there could have simply
been a scrivener's error, I suppose, that was negligently missed by no fewer than
535 people.17 Even accepting those isolated, remote possibilities, though, the real
question is: given the current state of the Doctrine, is the isolated, remote benefit
achieved by maintaining the Doctrine worth the negative effects of maintaining
i?178it?
C. Legislative Context: A BrieffHistory and Value Assessment
While the previous section accurately reflects the state of the Doctrine as it
applies to alleged new causes of action pursuant to new federal statutes, a
discussion of the current state of the Doctrine would not be complete without some
discussion of the manner in which the Court has grafted the concept of legislative
context onto the Doctrine.
At least as articulated by the Court for purposes of the Doctrine, the concept of
legislative context can be defined as the act of viewing the fundamental question-
did Congress intend to create a private right of action-within the historical context
in which the legislation was enacted." 9 The phrase "historical context" is then really
latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. Raising up causes
of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for
federal tribunals.") (internal citations omitted).
176. See, e.g., Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of
Statutory Interpretations, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1211* 12 (1990) (arguing that notions regarding a "unitary
intent" by Congress are premised upon fictions); Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1247, 1256-1257 (1990).
177. One hundred senators serve in the United States Senate. U.S. SENATE: Party Division in the Senate,
1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one-itemandteasers/partydiv.htm (last visited
January 1, 2013). Four hundred thirty-five representatives serve in the United States House of
Representatives. OFFICE OF THE CLERK U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Member FAQs,
http://clerk.house.gov/memberjinfo/memberfaq.aspx (last visited January 1, 2013).
178. This question is addressed infra Part IV.
179. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175* 76 (2005).
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a dressed up way of saying "judicial context.",o Thus, the ultimate question is: did
Congress affirmatively fail to explicitly address the creation of implied rights of
action in reliance on judicial holdings extant at the time of enactment?"'
The evolution of the Court's use of legislative context to determine intent
overlaps the history generally existing with implied rights cases. Nevertheless,
briefly discussing that history with a focus on the use of legislative context is
important insomuch as it is necessary to determine what exactly remains of the
concept, given the Court's current, constricted philosophical approach.
The concept of legislative context within the implied-rights jurisprudential line
first appeared, at least as it is relevant to this Article, in Cannon. As discussed
in Part II.B., the Court in Cannon was presented with whether section 901 of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1682 (1976) created
an implied private right of action.184 The Court held that it did, reasoning, in part,
that Congress enacted the language of Title IX against a "backdrop" of implied
rights of action existing under Title VI. Because the language of the two
statutory sections was nearly identical, the Court held, Congress must have intended
to have Title IX construed consistently with the Court's jurisprudence pursuant to
Title VI.16
While Cannon certainly indicated the Court's willingness to use legislative
context in interpreting the existence of implied rights, the Court did seem to imply
its own limitation on its use. Specifically, the Court stated that while its "evaluation
of congressional action in 1972 must take into account its contemporary legal
context," the Court intended to "adhere to the strict approach [announced] in [its]
recent cases, . . ." Thus, following Cannon, two rules seemed clear in terms of
the Court's use of legislative context: First, the Court would permit the use of
legislative context within the jurisprudential line as at least one factor for
determining congressional intent. Second, although the Court would permit the use
of the concept, the Court would stop short of permitting its use to abrogate or
modify the "strict approach" or framework the Court applied to implied-rights
cases.
In the years following Cannon, the Court began to slowly build on the concept.
For instance, three years after the Court delivered the opinion in Cannon, the Court
180. Id.
18 1. See id.
182. References to the Doctrine outside of the relevant context for this Article do exist before Cannon.
See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976). Nevertheless, those references address
issues distinct from the issues discussed herein.
183. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.
184. Id. at 680-682 ("That section, in relevant part, provides: 'No person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving financial assistance...").
185. Id. at 698 n.22.
186. Id. at 694-95.
187. Id. at 698* 99.
188. Id.
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in Curran, extended use of the concept to situations of implied ratification.'
Specifically, in situations where Congress amends statutory language against a
judicial backdrop of permitting implied rights but says nothing about the existence
or non-existence of private rights of action, the Court held that Congress' failure to
act constituted affirmative evidence of intent to permit implied rights of action."9
Furthermore, this remained true, even if Congress' understanding of the law was in
fact misplaced.' 9' Still, the Court stopped short of abrogating or modifying its
statement in Cannon that it intended to continue using its "strict approach" to new
implied rights of action.19
After Curran, the concept entered a dark period. '9 In fact, the Court did not
again address the issue until it delivered its opinion in Sandoval194 In Sandoval,
Sandoval and other similarly situated plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of
Public Safety ("the Department"), alleging the Department violated Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000(d) (2000) ("the Act").'"
Specifically, Sandoval alleged the Department violated disparate-impact regulations
196
promulgated by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") pursuant to sections 601 and
602 of the Act by exclusively administering drivers' license exams in English.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama agreed and
enjoined the English-only policy, holding DOJ possessed congressional authority to
issue the regulations pursuant to section 602 and those regulations gave rise to an
implied private right of action for enforcement.' 99 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on similar grounds.200
189. Curran, 456 U.S. at 378* 79. The Court mentioned the concept using similar language twenty-six
years later. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 165* 66 (2008).
190. Curran, 456 U.S. at 378* 79.
191. Id.
192. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-699.
193. The only references to the concept between 1982 and 2001 were in Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179-180,
and Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994). But,
the references were not a part of the Court's reasoning and did nothing to expand or explain the usage of the
Doctrine. Thus, for instance, the Court's entire discussion of the concept in Central Bank consisted of the
following: "When Congress reenacts statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction,
we often adhere to that construction in interpreting the reenacted statutory language. . . . Congress has not
reenacted the language of § 10(b) since 1934, however, so we need not determine whether the other
conditions for applying the reenactment doctrine are present." Id. (internal citations omitted).
194. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
195. Id. at 279.
196. Id. at 278 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000)) ("Section 601 provides that no person shall, 'on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity' covered by Title VI."').
197. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000)) ("Section 602 authorizes federal agencies 'to effectuate the
provisions of [§601].. by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability."') For purposes of
Sandoval, the Supreme Court assumed-without deciding-that DOJ was acting pursuant to proper
delegatory authority when it promulgated the disparate-impact regulations. Id. at 275.
198. Id.
199. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998).




On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Importantly, the
Sandoval Court was directly presented with the issue of whether the Court must
apply a Borak approach-rather than a Cort or textualist approach-to statutes
202enacted during the Court's Borak framework. The Court explicitly rejected the
contention, holding: "We have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn
of text. In determining whether statutes create private rights of action, as in
interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies
text."203
As it presently stands, then, legislative context principles are only useful to
clarify text.204  Thus, the value of those principles stems presumably from
ambiguous language within the text that can be "clarified" by analyzing the
historical context of the statute's enactment.20 Again, the notion appears circular in
application. Assuming again that the statutory language says nothing explicitly
about the existence of any private right-an assumption necessary to even begin an
implied rights analysis-then what text would be "clarified" by looking to
legislative context "evidence"? As before, one can certainly generate remote
hypotheticals, but the likelihood of those hypotheticals is slim. Even assuming,
however, that those hypotheticals arise, the use of legislative context principles are
nonetheless premised upon a speculative factual predicate. That is, the best that can
be said for using legislative context-in the absence of any explicit statement by
Congress-is that the results of any analysis could be correct. Examples are
sometimes helpful.
The Court's first opportunity to apply its Sandoval-legislative-context
principles occurred in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Education, 544 U.S. 167
(2005). In Jackson, the petitioner, a high school basketball coach, believed his
team was receiving disparate funding and access to athletic facilities. After
unsuccessfully lobbying his supervisors for what he believed was equal treatment
for his team, the petitioner was terminated. The petitioner thereafter sued the
Birmingham Board of Education, alleging the termination violated Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. section 1681 (2000).20 Specifically,
201. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
202. Brief of the United States, 2000 WL 1846063, 14* 15.
203. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286* 87 (internal citations omitted). This remains the law, although some
members of the Court believe the majority has occasionally not been faithful to the statement. See, e.g.,
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457-58 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Because the Court's
holding has no basis in the text of § 1981 and is not justified by principles of stare decisis, I respectfully
dissent.") (internal citations omitted); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 192* 93 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Under the majority's reasoning, courts may expand liability as they, rather than
Congress, see fit. . . . By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the majority returns this Court to
the days in which it created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose. In
doing so, the majority substitutes its policy judgments for the bargains struck by Congress . .
204. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286* 87.
205. Id. Even scholars who oppose strict construction agree that some level of ambiguity must exist before
the Court may engage the process of interpretation. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 176, at 1249 ("[C]ourts
may not invoke contestable or controversial interpretive principles when there is no ambiguity. . . . Where
there is no ambiguity, courts must defer.").
206. The section provides in pertment part: "No person .. . shall, on the basis of sex, be . .. subjected to
discrimination under any education program . .. receiving Federal financial assistance."
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the petitioner alleged his retaliatory discharge was discrimination on the basis of
sex. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding Title IX's implied private
right of action 20 7 does not include retaliatory discharge claims. The court of appeals
subsequently affirmed, holding the statute is silent on whether a private right of
action exists for retaliatory discharge, and thus, under the textualist model espoused
by the Court in Sandoval,208 no private right of action existed.209
The Supreme Court reversed, holding Title IX's implied private of action
includes an implied right of action for retaliatory discharge. 2 10 The Court premised
its holding on three analytical bases--only one of which is relevant for purposes of
this discussion.21 The Court reasoned that Congress enacted Title IX three years
after the Court issued its opinion in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969).212 It is thus reasonable to "presume",213 the Court held, that Congress
believed Title IX would be construed congruently with Sullivan.2 14 The
207. In 1979, the Supreme Court held that Title IX has an implied right of action to enforce its prohibition
against intentional sex discrimination. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979). The Court has
subsequently reaffirmed that position on a number of occasions on the basis of precedent. See, e.g., Franklin
v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992); Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
639 (1999). Accordingly, Jackson is viewed as an extension case because the plaintiff in Jackson was not
attempting to create a new implied cause of action in the first instance. Rather, the plaintiff in Jackson was
attempting to extend an existing implied right of action to new conduct. In any event, the analysis remains the
same whether the Court is generating a new implied right or extending an existing implied right-the focus
remains on the intent of Congress. See, e.g., Cen. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994).
208. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
209. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1345 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 544 U.S. 167
(2005).
210. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173* 74.
211. While not central to the point made in this section of the Article, it is interesting to note that the
Court's analysis in Jackson furthers the inconsistencies that originated in Cannon and is not faithful to the
Court's textualist framework. The first two analytical bases for the holding were the following: First, the
Court held the statutory text included an implied private right of action. Specifically, the Court held that
retaliation constitutes sex discrimination-the conduct prohibited by the statutory text-because the discharge
is a response to a complaint for sexual discrimination. Id. On that basis, the Court distinguished Sandoval,
reasoning the private right of action here arose from the statutory text as opposed to the administrative
regulations that implemented the statutory text. Id. at 177* 78. Second, the Court premised it reasoning on
the broad, remedial purposes of the statute and the best mechanism of effectuating Congress' intent.
Specifically, quoting the Court's ruling in Cannon, the Court held that the statute was enacted "'to provide
individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory] practices[,]... ' and "this objective 'would be
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have effective
protection against retaliation."' Id. at 180* 81. In fact, the "enforcement scheme . . . depends on individual
reporting[,] . . ." and thus, "if retaliation were not prohibited, [the statute's] enforcement scheme would
unravel." Id.
The first basis can be analytically dismissed as largely premised upon precedent rather than analysis.
That is, the Court's first basis for permitting an implied right in the first instance is simply reliance upon
Cannon. Id. at 173. That is, in fact, why Jackson is an extension case. The second analytical basis, however,
is troubling from a doctrinal perspective, as it is inconsistent with Touche, Transamerica, and Sandoval and
thus represents a clear departure from the Court's textualist focus on the first two Cort factors. This basis is,
instead, identical to the reasoning in Borak and is consistent with the third prong of the Cort analysis.
212. In Sullivan, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. section 1982 provided an implied right of action for
retaliation, even though the language of section 1982 said nothing about retaliation. Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969).




presumption remained sound, even though Title IX and section 1982, the statutory
section interpreted by Sullivan, are structurally different and were enacted during
different historical periods.21
I am not suggesting the analysis is wrong. It could be correct. I am not
suggesting the analysis is correct. It could be wrong. The point is that it could be.
And, because that is the best we can hope to achieve using legislative context as a
mechanism to determine intent, we must accept that any result we reach based upon
this "evidence" is simply a speculative discussion of possibilities.21 Of course,
once we enter the speculative realm of possibilities, many otherwise unlikely
scenarios become relevant. A case in point: What if we took the analysis in
Jackson and changed it slightly. Let's say that instead of discussing whether
Congress could have intended to extend an implied right for retaliatory conduct in
Title IX, that it instead did not bear one singular goal.21 Let's say half of the
legislators who voted in favor of the legislation never actually considered the
possibility of an implied right of action for retaliation. Let's then say another
quarter of the legislators did prospectively envision the existence of an implied right
and intended that one exist. Finally, let's assume the remaining balance of
legislators affirmatively envisioned the possibility of an implied right but did not
want to create one. Is the scenario possible? What if we change that hypothetical
and assume that the final quarter of legislators did not hope to accomplish anything
through the legislation. Let's assume that instead their votes were responses to
political pressures within their jurisdictions and they voted for the language as it
existed because it lacked a real enforcement mechanism but nonetheless appeared
ameliorative from the perspective of a layman.21 Possible? Likely?
At this point, I would expect any reasonable legal mind to wonder: But, no
evidence exists to support those hypotheticals. You are simply speculating about
what the undisclosed intentions of the legislators could have been. Those criticisms
are correct and reflect my criticisms of the Court's current usage of legislative
context evidence-the legislators could have actually known about the relevant
215. Compare 20 U.S.C. §1681 (West 2012) ("No person. . . shall, on the basis of sex, be .. . subjected to
discrimination under any education program . . . receiving Federal financial assistance."), with 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (West 2012) ("All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.").
216. A similar argument has been made by Justice Antonin Scalia, although he did not use the argument as
a basis for arguing the Doctrine should be abolished. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
Ulrich, LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1625* 26 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). Furthermore, scholars have also
criticized the Court's use of congressional silence as a mechanism of discerning intent. See, e.g., Joseph A.
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's
Authority, 107 HARV. L. REv. 961, 995 (1994) (arguing that legislative silence is a "weak reed upon which to
lean").
217. Scholars, in other contexts, have argued that the notion of a "unitary goal" by Congress is a fiction.
See, e.g., Moglen & Pierce, supra note 176, at 1212.
218. In other contexts, scholars have recognized that "deliberate ambiguity" is a tactic used by
legislatures. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Central Bank: The Methodology, the Message, and the
Future, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 13, 36* 37 (1995). Furthermore, and in a broader context, scholars have at least
questioned whether the presumption that legislators are rational actors is a valid presumption. See, e.g.,
Moglen & Pierce, supra note 176, at 1211.
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judicial interpretations.21 Additionally, the legislators could have actually
220
considered the possibility of creating or extending an implied right of action.
Finally, the legislators could have actually relied upon the relevant judicial
interpretations, and as a result, not explicitly discussed the existence of an implied
right within the statutory text or the legislative history. But, each of those analytical
steps are premised upon a possibility-not an actuality. Thus, they are no more or
less speculative than my hypothetical.221 And, even assuming arguendo the first
two presumptions are reasonable, even in the absence of any actual evidence to
support it, the final presumption is premised upon an analytical leap that is virtually
non-existent within other areas of jurisprudence.222 At bottom, then, the value of
219. The Court, in a variety of contexts, has stated that it presumes Congress is aware of its decisions. In
contexts outside of implied-rights cases, similar presumptions are referred to as "benign fiction[s]". See
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court presumes
Congress is aware of the entire body of law when enacting new legislation, and that presumption is a "benign
fiction"). And, scholars have taken opposing views on whether fictions should exist within the law. Compare
Sunstein, supra note 176, at 1256, with Moglen & Pierce, supra note 176, at 1211.
220. The Court's jurisprudence itself highlights the speculative nature of this line of thought. For
instance, in Morse, a plurality of the Court held that one could not assume Congress was aware of its decision
in Cort when interpreting a particular statute, as the decision was only seven weeks old at the time the statute
was enacted. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 234 n.47 (1996). Using this analytical
framework, a reasonable question would be: where does the Mendoza line lie?
221. Additional arguments in this regard are subject to the same criticisms. Thus, for example, a party
could argue that all of the Court's interpretations are constructively ratified by inaction. See, e.g.,
Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[A]fter a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of
decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial
gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."). That is, if the Court's interpretation were actually wrong,
Congress could simply legislate in derogation of it. Because Congress has not done that, it must have agreed
with the result. Thus, as the reasoning would go, following some reasonable temporal period, any speculation
associated with the Court's reasoning in permitting or denying an implied right is constructively ratified. See,
e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1021* 22 (1992)
("Legislative inaction is always inherently ambiguous and could reflect nothing more than a crowded
legislative agenda. But as long as ratification is limited to cases where at least the relevant committees have
been informed of an interpretation, and Congress reenacts the relevant legislation without change, it is
probably a useful doctrine."). This argument, though, compounds the injury, as it requires even more layers
of speculation. That is, to make the constructive ratification argument work, one would need to assume
Congress knew about the Court's precedent, understood the precedent, and affirmatively made the decision to
do nothing. That just added three assumptions to the house of cards. See, e.g., William D. Popkin, Law-
Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 885* 86 (1995).
222. In any standard civil lawsuit wherein a cause of action requires an element of reliance, a party must
typically demonstrate the existence of both objective and subjective reliance. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel &
Waiver § 117 (2012). Thus, for example, if a plaintiff is alleging promissory estoppel as a ground for
enforcement of a promise, the plaintiff will bear the burden of demonstrating that both a reasonable person
would have relied upon the promise and that he/she (the plaintiff) actually relied upon the promise. Id.
Focusing on the subjective prong, speculation about whether the plaintiff actually relied will be insufficient.
Rather, the plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence indicating the plaintiff actually relied upon the
promise. Id. Commonly, a plaintiff could meet this burden through simply testifying to the fact. But, in any
event, a causal link between the actual reliance and the damages (the result) must be affirmatively proven. Id.
What the Court has effectively done within the legislative context arena of implied-rights jurisprudence is
used a reliance-based legal theory without imparting to it the usual restrictions for its use. Just as it seems
analytically thin to simultaneously say a plaintiff "relied" upon a promise without any affirmative proof of
subjective reliance, it is analytically thin to suggest Congress relied upon the Court's precedents without some
affirmative proof. But, the irony is that legislative context evidence is only useful when affirmative proof is
absent.
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legislative context evidence for purposes of implied-rights jurisprudence is identical
to the value of the implied-rights Doctrine-in its current form, it exists solely to
protect an unlikely possibility.
III. WEIGHING BENEFICIAL VALUE IN LIGHT OF LEGAL THEORY
As discussed in Part III, Sections B & C, the value stemming from maintaining
the Doctrine is premised upon protecting a possibility; to the extent Congress says
nothing explicitly about the existence of an implied right in the text of the statute
and Congress says nothing negative about an implied right within the legislative
history, then maintaining the Doctrine protects against the possibility that Congress
harbored a secret desire to create an implied right but nonetheless failed to provide
for one explicitly. Or, in the context of legislative context arguments, the Doctrine
protects against the possibility that Congress both actually knew about the Court's
precedents and actually relied upon those precedents by assuming the Court would
create an implied right. That's the value. So, what can we weight it against? First,
the Doctrine fails to achieve efficient use of judicial resources and compromises the
legitimacy of the judicial system by producing inconsistent and unpredictable
decisions. Second, abolition of the Doctrine would have a neutral impact on
corrective justice.
A. Evaluating the Doctrine in Light ofAdministrative Efficiency Theory
For decades, the federal judiciary has experienced a "'crisis of volume"223 in
its caseloads, leading a number of scholars to suggest a variety of reforms aimed at
revolutionizing the federal court system to achieve better administrative
224
efficiency. As a corollary to that discussion, scholars have additionally discussed
the potential of limiting access to the federal courts as a mechanism of achieving
greater efficiency.22 Thus, for instance, scholars have discussed implementing user
fees, compelling alternative dispute resolution, and increased involvement of the
226
judiciary in the settlement process. And, these discussions have not been limited
to scholars. Rather, many of these proposals have arisen, in the first instance,
through congressionally created committees.22 Furthermore, on one occasion, the
Court has affirmatively stated that, within the context of the Doctrine, the Court has
in fact altered its doctrinal vision in the past based, at least in part, upon the
caseload of its lower courts.228 Notwithstanding the attention paid to Administrative
223. Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the US. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV.
913, 915 (1994) (quoting REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE 109 (Apr. 2, 1990)).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Robert G. Vaughn, Normative Controversies Underlying Contemporary Debates About
Civil Justice Reform: A Way of Talking About Bureaucracy and the Future of the Federal Courts, 76 DENV.
U. L. REv. 217, 228 (1998) (discussing the existing scholarly literature).
226. Id.
227. See Baker, supra note 223, at 915.
228. While scholars have not discussed the area, the Court has implied that it began to cabin the Doctrine
in the first instance as a means of controlling the caseload in the lower courts. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982) ("The increased complexity of federal legislation and the
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Efficiency Theory in general, scholars have been largely silent on its application to
the Doctrine, with few scholars discussing its application, and even then, only
discussing the application of the Theory within the context of either expanding or
contracting the Doctrine.229 To date, no scholar has discussed the normative impact
of Administrative Efficiency Theory as applied to eliminating the Doctrine. This
section begins that discussion.
Over the past several decades, the budget of the federal judiciary has remained
relatively flat.23 0 Nevertheless, the caseload of the federal judiciary has never been
greater. From 2010 to 2011, there was a 4.3% increase in civil court filings in the
United States district courts.21 That increase was preceded by a 9.2% increase from
2009 to 2010232 and a 5.3% increase from 2008 to 2009.23 Additionally, that
increase exists notwithstanding sixty-six vacancies in the United States district
234 231
courts and sixteen vacancies in the United States courts of appeals.
Collectively, there are seventy-five vacancies in the federal courts, accounting for
236
approximately 8% of the total federal judiciary, and Chief Justice Roberts has
referred to twenty-seven of those vacancies as "judicial emergencies." 237 Taken
together, then, it is safe to say that the resources of the federal judiciary are strained
both from a budgetary perspective and a human perspective.
Furthermore, it is safe to say that the continued existence of the Doctrine has
contributed to this strain. For instance, in 2008, Congress enacted the Troubled
Asset Relief Program ("TARP").238 Thereafter, in conformance with the
increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of
legislative intent than Rigsby had required.").
229. See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76
WASH. L. REv. 67, 146* 47 (2001).
230. The total federal judicial budget in 2010 was 6.8 billion. The total requested budget for the federal
judiciary in 2012 was 7.3 billion. The Federal Judiciary, available at
http://www.cobum.senate.gov/public/index.cfi?a=Files.Serve&File-id=24a45972-f9e6-406f-940f-
dac2bbbba94e (last visited January 2, 2013).
231. UNITED STATES COURTS Caseload Statistics 2011, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/201 I/tables/
C0OMar 11.pdf (last visited December 18, 2012). During the same period, criminal court filings have
increased as well. See also UNITED STATES COURTS, Judicial Caseload Indicators, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/20 11/front/I
ndicatorsMarl l.pdf (last visited January 2, 2013).
232. UNITED STATES COURTS, Caseload Statistics, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspxdoc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/
C00Marl0.pdf (last visited December 18, 2012).
233. UNITED STATES COURTS, Caseload Statistics 2009, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalludicialCaseloadStatistics/2009/tables/
COOMarO9.pdf (last visited December 18, 2012). During the same period, criminal court filings increased by
7.6%. UNITED STATES COURTS, Caseload Statistics 2009, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts.Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/appendices/D13CSepli.pdf (last visited
January 25, 2013).
234. UNITED STATES COURTS, Judicial Vacancies, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies.aspx (last visited March 28, 2013).
235. Id.
236. Bill Mears, Chief Justice Laments 'Fiscal Clif' Effect on Federal Courts, CNN (December 31, 2012,
6:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/3 1/politics/fiscal-cliff-roberts/index.html.
237. Id.
238. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-5241 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
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requirements of TARP, the Secretary of the Treasury issued regulations pursuant to
the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP"). 239 Between 2010 and
2012, literally hundreds of cases were filed in the federal courts alleging implied
rights of action pursuant to TARP and/or HAMP. 240  All of those cases have
241failed2. Similar results exist for attempted implied actions pursuant to Sarbanes-
242
Oxley. To drive the point home, within the past four years alone, cases have been
filed in the federal courts seeking recognition of implied rights of action pursuant to
241 244Federal Acquisitions Regulations, Section 8 of the Securities Exchange Act,2 the
Savings and Loan Holding Company Act,24 the Indian Law Technical Amendments
of 1987,246 the Davis-Bacon Act,247 the Investment Company Act,24 the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act,249 the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,250 the Church
251 252
Amendment, the American Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act,
the Indian Lands Open Dump Cleanup Act,2' the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act,254 the
Air Carrier Access Act,255 the Federal Telecommunications Act,25 the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act,257 the United States Housing Act,258 the Atlantic
259 260
Coastal Fisheries Act, the Higher Education Act, the Securities Investor
239. HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 09-01, INTRODUCTION
OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION 1 (Apr. 6, 2009) [hereinafter HAMP, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE
09-01], available at www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp-servicer/sd0901.pdf.
240. See, e.g., Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 12-50064, 2012 WL 4513333 (5th Cir. 2012);
Nelson v. Bank of Am., 446 Fed. App'x 158, 159 (11th Cir. 2011); Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, 798 F. Supp.
2d 1059, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Cox v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (D.
Minn. 2011); Fernandes v. U.S. Bank, 446 B.R. 6, 8-9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); Hart v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
241. See supra note 240.
242. See, e.g., Commercial Dev. Co. v. Abitibi-Consolidated, Inc., No. C07-5172RJB, 2008 WL 110513
(W.D. Wash. 2008).
243. See Ciliv v. UXB, Intern., Inc., No. 7:12-cv-290, 2012 WL 5245323 (W.D. Va. 2012).
244. See Larach v. Standard Chartered Bank Intern. Ltd., 724 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
245. See Spencer Bank, S.L.A. v. Seidman, 309 F. App'x 546 (3rd Cir. 2009).
246. See Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2010).
247. See Lewis v. Gaylor, Inc., No. 1:11-cv014210SEB-TAB, 2012 WL 4357861 (S.D. Ind. 2012).
248. See Northstar Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 615 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2010).
249. See Umland v. Planco Fin. Servs. Inc., 542 F.3d 59 (3rd. Cir. 2008); Glanville v. Dupar, Inc., 727 F.
Supp. 2d 596 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
250. See Glanville, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 596; Bendsen v. George Weston Bakeries Distrib., Inc., No.
4:08CV50 JCH, 2008 WL 4449435 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
251. See Cenzon-Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3129(RJD), 2010 WL 169485 (E.D.N.Y.
2010).
252. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2011).
253. Id. at 43.
254. See In re Lenz, 448 B.R. 832 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011); In re Lentz, 405 B.R. 893 (Bankr N.D. Ohio
2009).
255. See Hill v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-3243-RMG-BM, 2011 WL 1113499 (D.S.C. 2011);
Jackson v. United Airlines, Inc., 2009 WL 1036068 (E.D. Va. 2009).
256. See Qwest Commc'ns. Corp. v. Maryland -Nat'l CapitalPark & Planning Comm'n, No. RWT
07cv2199, 2010 WL 1980153 (D. Md. 2010).
257. See D.G. ex rel. Stricklin v. Henry, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (N.D. Okla. 2009).
258. See Reyes-Garay v. Integrand Assurance Co., 818 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D.P.R. 2011).
259. See Martha's Vineyard/Dukes Cnty. Fishermen's Ass'n v. Locke, 811 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D.D.C.
2011).
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Protection Act, the Change in Bank Control Act,262 the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act,26 and the Federal Credit Union Act.264 All of those actions
have failed as well.26 During the same period of time, the federal courts have only
permitted new implied rights in the context of two statutory schemes.26 Looking
back even further, the Supreme Court has not recognized a new implied right of
action since 1996.267
While these numbers are compelling, they admittedly account for a fraction of
the federal court filings in any given year.26 Additionally, given the existence of
some success by plaintiffs,269 coupled with perhaps notions of corrective justice,270
one could argue the continued existence of the Doctrine serves some normative
purpose. Those positions are further bolstered by visceral notions that, at least
where necessary, efficiency should be sacrificed on the altar of justice.271 Taken
together, then, the comparative balance facially appears to either be at a stalemate
260. See Bowers v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 10 Civ. 8675(PKC), 2011 WL3585986
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gruen v. EdFund, No. C 09-00644 JSW, 2009 WL 2136785 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
261. See Patteson v. McAdams Tax Advisory Group, LLC, No. 09-2085, 2010 WL 711158 (W.D. Tenn.
2010).
262. See Liberty Bell Bank v. Deitsch, No. 08-0993 (RMB), 2008 WL4276925 (D.N.J. 2008).
263. See Catholic Charities CYO v. Chertoff, 622 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
264. See Burch v. Nat'l Fed. Credit Union Admin., No. CV 11-02309-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 714838 (D.
Ariz. 2012).
265. See supra notes 243* 64.
266. During that period of time, implied rights of action cases were successful pursuant to two statutory
schemes-the Servicemember's Civil Relief Act, see Gordon v. Pete's Auto Service of Denbigh, Inc., 838 F.
Supp. 2d 436 (E.D. Va. 2012), and the Labor-Management Relations Act, see Int'l Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Ward, 563 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2009). This discussion excludes cases
addressing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983, as those cases are distinct from traditional implied-
rights-of-action cases. Nevertheless, even if those cases are considered, this list only grows by one statutory
scheme-the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act. Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'1 Centers, 570 F.3d 520 (3rd
Cir. 2009). And, courts do not uniformly permit implied rights of action pursuant to the Federal Nursing
Home Reform Act. See, e.g., Duncan v. Johnson-Mathers Health Care, Inc., No. 5:09-CV-00417-KKC, 2010
WL 3000718 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (holding no private right of action existed). This discussion also does not
address rights that arise solely through the use of the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Chase v. Pub. Util.
Comm'n of Pa., No. 1:05-CV-2375, 2008 WL 906491 (M.D. Pa. 2008). But, assuming those cases were well-
grounded at one time, their continuing vitality is questionable following the decision in Douglas v. Indep.
Living Center of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). The discussion also excludes extension cases, as those
cases do not create implied rights within the first instance but rather discern the parameters of an existing
implied right. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008) (holding the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act permits an implied right of action for retaliation claims).
267. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996) (holding an implied right of action exists
pursuant to the Voting Rights Act). This does not account for extension cases or section 1983 actions-both
of which are different strands of analysis. If extension cases are included, then the Supreme Court has
extended private rights in four cases since 1996. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167
(2005); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008);
Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Furthermore, if section 1983 actions are included,
then the Supreme Court has recognized implied rights in section 1983 actions for damages in one case since
1996. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
268. See UNITED STATES COURTS, Caseload Statistics 2011, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/20 11/tables/
COOMar ll.pdf (last visited December 18, 2012).
269. See supra note 266.
270. This Article evaluates corrective justice as applied to the Doctrine in Part IV, Section B.
271. See Zeigler, supra note 229, at 146* 47.
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or in favor of maintaining the Doctrine in some form. That facial appearance is
misleading.
Perhaps the best mechanism of evaluating the relative weight of these
arguments is to envision a hypothetical world without the Doctrine. Stated
differently, the pivotal question seems to be whether-or to what degree-the
benefits of the Doctrine can be achieved without generating waste. In a
hypothetical world without the Doctrine, private rights of action could only be
created explicitly by Congress, and thus, to the extent Congress failed to articulate a
specific mechanism to privately enforce a federal statute, enforcement would be left
to either the attorney general or an administrative agency. Immediately, four things
become clear. First, the hypothetical system is not-in purpose-different from the
existing jurisprudential landscape. That is, in the existing jurisprudential
landscape-a landscape where implied rights exist-the role of the federal courts is
solely to discern Congress's intent. In the hypothetical system, Congress's intent
controls, but the role of the federal courts to determine Congress's intent-at least
to the extent of determining whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action-is extinguished. Instead, Congress is charged with textually explaining its
intent. Immediately, this reduces the disparity associated with having ninety-four
different district court jurisdictions,27 with potentially 677 different judges,27
decide whether Congress intended to create a private right of action in literally
hundreds of different federal statutes. Second, and as a result of the first, the flow
of frivolous claims related to implied rights of action would cease. And, to the
extent some lawyers would be willing to file such claims, procedural mechanisms
of deterrence exist.274 Third, and perhaps as a corollary to the second, Congress
would presumably create explicit rights of action for a number of federal statutes.
Thus, some of the caseload initially eliminated by abolition would be replaced with
filings related to explicit rights of action authorized by Congress.27 Finally, the
current inconsistencies within the articulation and application of the Doctrine would
cease, as federal courts would no longer need to struggle with determining whether
272. UNITED STATES COURTS, FAQ: Federal Judges, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited December 18, 2012).
273. As of 2011, Congress had authorized 677 district court judgeships. Administrative Office of the
United States Court, 2011 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts ,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf (last
visited December 18, 2012).
274. See, e.g., FED. R. Cv. PRO. R. 11 (West 2012).
275. Additional ramifications are possible. Specifically, if the Court eliminated the Doctrine tomorrow,
the remaining question would be whether the Court eliminated the Doctrine only within the context of
implying new rights of action or whether the Court would eliminate the Doctrine in the context of both
implying new rights of action and permitting the continued recognition of existing implied rights of action. If
the Court took the former approach, then the Doctrine would technically still exist, as the Court would
continue to permit cases filed pursuant to currently recognized implied rights. As a result, plaintiffs would
presumably still be able to argue for extensions of those existing implied rights. If the Court took the latter
approach, the Doctrine would be completely abolished. But, at least for purposes of argument, one would
have to assume Congress approves of at least some of the private rights the Court has generated. Or, at a
minimum, one could assume Congress, in retrospect, believes those private rights are normatively good. If
true, then one would expect a flurry of legislation to fill the gaps left as a result of abolition.
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Cort is mandatory or instructive.27 Instead, federal courts would simply be charged
with determining whether Congress explicitly authorized a private right.
Taken together, the hypothetical jurisprudential landscape is more efficient.
Even assuming Congress expended resources in proposing, drafting, and ultimately
amending a variety of statutory frameworks to include explicit rights of action
277where implied rights once existed, the resources would be expended in a manner
better tailored to achieve the doctrinal purposes that currently support the
Doctrine-achieving Congress's intent. After all, as between Congress and the
federal judiciary, it seems unequivocal that Congress is better suited to articulate its
278own intent. But, more importantly, even assuming abolition resulted in no net
monetary savings, abolition would at least reduce substantial waste. Specifically, it
would reduce the waste associated with frivolous filings that attempt to torture the
language of statutory schemes in hopes of creating implied rights, it would reduce
the judicial waste at all levels of the federal courts that ultimately expend resources
to dispose of those filings, and it would eliminate the waste expended by lower
federal courts in attempting to discern both the proper articulation and application
of the Doctrine. Furthermore, while notions of collective justice will be more fully
addressed in Section C, for purposes of lingering concerns here, abolition would
create no greater burden on collective justice principles than the current application
of the Doctrine. Accordingly, at least for purposes of Administrative Efficiency
Theory, abolition would serve a normative good.
B. Evaluating the Doctrine in Light ofProcedural Justice Theory
The credibility-and thus the legitimacy-of the judiciary and the judicial
system is a delicate thing.29 Without credibility, the legitimacy of the system fails
and the system collapses.28 As a general statement, Procedural Justice Theory
seeks to quantify and understand what exactly gives credibility and legitimacy to
2811
institutional-governmental structures. In attempting to define and quantify the
concepts of credibility and legitimacy and their relationships with the judiciary,
scholars have presented a number of models from both empirical282 and theoretical
276. See supra Part II, Section C.
277. As indicated in footnote 276, this would only be necessary if the Court were to completely abolish
the Doctrine and thus not continue to permit the recognition of existing implied rights of action. See supra
note 275 and accompanying text.
278. But see Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 36* 37 (arguing the better drafting rationale is normatively
negative).
279. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1043-45
(1994).
280. Wayne McCormack, Judicial Independence in Times of Crisis: Introduction, 2011 UTAH. L. REV. 1,
7 (2011).
281. See Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 103 (1988)
282. See, e.g., id. (stating the seven independent variables are: "(1) the degree to which those authorities
were motivated to be fair; (2) judgments of their honesty; (3) the degree to which the authorities followed
ethical principles of conduct; (4) the extent to which opportunities for representation were provided; (5) the
quality of the decisions made; (6) the opportunities for error correction; and (7) whether the authorities
behaved in a biased fashion.").
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approaches.28 While empiricists and theorists have certainly taken different paths
in their analysis of the variables that affect procedural justice, their arguments
generally bear common themes.284 Thus, for instance, both empiricists and theorists
. 285 . 286 287 . 288generally agree that standing, voice, neutrality, and consistency play at
least some role in perceptions ofjustice.
In analyzing each of these common variables within the context of the
Doctrine, it is initially clear that standing is inapplicable. As a concept, standing
refers to the extent to which "authorities engag[e] in respectful and ethical treatment
of individuals." 289 There is simply nothing-empirical or intuitive-to indicate that
the behavior of judges toward litigants would be altered by abolition of the
290Doctrine. Thus, analyzing this particular mechanism provides nothing in the way
of assessing the utility of the Doctrine. Accordingly, the remainder of this
discussion will only address the mechanisms of voice, neutrality, and consistency.
In terms of voice, abolition of the Doctrine is likely to achieve a neutral result.
The concept of voice, at least within the confines of Procedural Justice Theory,
refers to the "extent . .. [to which] a defendant perceive[s] that he has had a genuine
opportunity to state his case and that his needs are being treated as a matter of
concem[.]"291 Initially, it would seem that maintaining the Doctrine enhances voice
by permitting plaintiffs at least some ability to speak in court. That is, if the
Doctrine were to be abolished, plaintiffs would lose the ability to even argue that a
cause of action existed, resulting in more limited access to the judicial system for
redress of grievances. That limitation, then, would lead to an ultimate decline in
voice and thus a decline in overall credibility of the judicial system.
Admittedly, abolition of the Doctrine would lead to diminished access to the
federal courts for claims whose origins were premised solely upon the Doctrine.
But, that does not necessarily mean that abolition of the Doctrine would lead to
diminished avenues to exercise voice for two reasons. First, federal statutes always
292have some mechanism of enforcement-whether it be a prosecutor, an
283. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum,Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004).
284. These common themes have been identified by other scholars. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein,
Procedural Justice: Tempering the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843,
1875* 76 (2002).
285. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 149 (2011);
286. See, e.g., id.; Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After
Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1251, 1292 (1998).
287. See, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 285, at 149.
288. See, e.g., id.
289. Epstein, supra note 284, at 1877.
290. Scholars have criticized the dearth of professional requirements placed upon the judiciary. See
generally Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading by Example, 52 S.C. L. REV. 667
(2001).
291. Epstein, supra note 284, at 1876.
292. Thus, for example, criminal statutes are presumptively enforceable by prosecutors. Adam H.
Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45
EMORY L.J. 1, 64 (1996); see also, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 194 (2006) (stating that the United States attorneys are
charged with prosecuting contempt of Congress).
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293 294
administrative mechanism, or private citizens. Thus, there is always some
mechanism of exercising voice. And, at least in the empirical sense, that is all that
is required to maintain a sense of credibility in the system.295 Second, abolition of
the Doctrine does not even necessarily limit access to the federal courts; rather, it
would only limit access to the federal courts for claims that rest solely upon the
296Doctrine. Stated differently, abolition would only limit claims that are nearly
destined to fail, and abolition would not limit access in cases where plaintiffs had
one or more claims that are premised upon other causes of action. Accordingly, in
those cases, voice in the general sense would not be limited at all, and thus, this
particular variable within Procedural Justice Theory could be maintained at a
relatively neutral level even following abolition.
Although the variable of voice would be largely unaffected by abolition, the
concepts of neutrality and consistency would experience significant alterations as a
result of abolition. The concept of neutrality refers to the extent to which "the
relevant legal authority [is] honest, engaged in fact-based decision making, and
functioning in the absence of bias or prejudice."297 Stated differently, the concept of
neutrality is intertwined with the notion of merit-based decision-making. In a
similar vein, the concept of consistency, for purposes of Procedural Justice Theory,
is defined as the extent to which "authorities treat[] similarly situated persons in a
similar manner[.]"298 Taken together, then, the two variables seek consistent, merit-
299
based decision-making.
When measured against this metric, the effects of maintaining the Doctrine are
uniformly negative-at least given the Doctrine's current state. Specifically, as to
consistency, the continued existence of the Doctrine has led to whole lines of
inconsistency-and thus uncertainty-within the jurisprudential line."'
Furthermore, while some level of inconsistency and uncertainty is perhaps to be
expected within any jurisprudential line, in terms of the Doctrine, the inconsistency
and uncertainty are counterbalanced by, at best, nominal substantive weight,' and,
what substantive value exists within the Doctrine could be achieved even if
abolition occurred. Thus, to some extent, the only true result of maintaining the
Doctrine has been to affirmatively create uncertainty.
293. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437(d) (2009) (stating the Federal Election Campaign Commission has authority
to, among other things, initiate civil actions for violations of the scheme).
294. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) ("[A]ny person injured ... [by violation of this Act] may sue
therefore in any appropriate United States district court . . .").
295. See, e.g., Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A
Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 506 (2010) (describing victim's statements at
sentencing hearings as a means of exercising voice).
296. See Pauline E. Calande, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the Demise of Implied
Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1150 (1985) (for the proposition that abolition would have no
affect on the ability of the states to create causes of action based upon federal statutes).
297. Epstein, supra note 284, at 1877.
298. Id.
299. Id; see also, e.g., Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 285, at 135.
300. See supra Parts lI.C, W.A.
301. See supra Part III. B-C.
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As to merit-based decision-making, the existence of the Doctrine has equally
negative effects. Before endeavoring to prove the point, it is necessary to identify
and define "non-meritorious decision-making." Although no scholar has definitely
defined non-merit-based decision-making within the context of Procedural Justice
Theory, for purposes of this Article, a non-meritorious decision-through the lens
of Procedural Justice Theory-is one that is either actually not based upon merit or
one that generates a reasonable perception that it is not based upon merit. In
terms of the former, a decision is non-meritorious if it is not based upon any
reasonable application of the Court's test.303  In terms of the latter, a number of
examples are possible. But, for purposes of this Article, the latter type will focus on
transparency, as transparency creates a subjective perception of merit-based
decision-making, and inversely, non-transparency creates a reasonable perception
of non-merit-based decision-making.m At its core, then, this definition is not
concerned with whether the result of any particular inquiry is sound. Rather, this
definition is concerned with whether the analytical basis for the decision is both
sound and clearly articulated.
Using this definitional framework, the continued existence of the Doctrine has
resulted in a number of decisions that generate at least a reasonable perception of
non-meritorious decision-making. For instance, in Jackson, the Court held Title
IX's implied private right of action includes an implied right of action for
retaliatory discharge.305 The Court premised its holding upon three bases, only one
306
of which is relevant here. Specifically, the Court premised its reasoning on the
broad, remedial purposes of the statute and the best mechanism of effectuating
302. While these two aspects are not part of a "framework" for any scholar, their specters are frequently
present in the literature. See, e.g., Katherine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal
System for Publishing Reports of "Bad" Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2031, 2074* 76 (2012) ("Clearly articulated rules are essential to avoiding the risk of error as 'known
standards ... limit the allocation choices of . .. officials. They require that choices be made according to
principle rather than the preference of the official . . . .' Thus, fairness in this civil context refers to actions
taken 'according to known standards that are impartially applied through revealed procedures."'); Earl M.
Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 370 (1988) (arguing that adherence to stare decisis
creates a perception of both justice and meritorious decision-making).
303. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 792* 93 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("At the very least, due process requires that the relevant state decisionmaker listen to the claimant
and then apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision. The failure to observe these minimal procedural
safeguards creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and erroneous deprivations.") (footnotes omitted). In a
related vein, the Court has stated, in other contexts, that stare decisis is critical to "the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). This statement is not only
true within this constitutional system of justice; it is so axiomatic, that it can be seen at the international level
as well. See, e.g., William E. Davis & Helga Turku, Access to Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
2011 J. DIsP. RESOL. 47, 48 (2011) (quoting United Nations, Rule of Law, Report of the Secretary-General on
the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies,http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
304. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 285, at 157; see also Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public
Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAuL L.
REV. 661, 664 (2006) ("Transparency and openness foster the belief that decision-making procedures are
neutral."); Erik Luna, Principles Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 515, 564* 65 (2000)
(discussing the importance of transparency for law enforcement through the lens of Procedural Justice
Theory).
305. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176* 77 (2005).
306. See supra Part III.C.
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Congress' intent. Specifically, quoting the Court's ruling in Cannon,307 the Court
held that the statute was enacted 'to provide individual citizens effective protection
against [discriminatory] practices,"' and "this objective 'would be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not
have effective protection against retaliation."'3 0 In fact, the "enforcement
scheme ... depends on individual reporting," and thus, "if retaliation were not
prohibited, [the statute's] enforcement scheme would unravel." 9 From a doctrinal
perspective, the analytical basis does not conform to the Court's articulated test. As
discussed in Part II, Sections B & C, these statements are inconsistent with
Touche,"o Transamerica,3'l and Sandoval,3 1 2 and thus represent a clear departure
313 314
from the Court's textualist focus on the first two Cort factors. This basis is,
instead, identical to the reasoning in Borak" and is consistent with the third prong
of the Cort analysis. The problem, of course, is that the Court has departed from its
test without explicitly recognizing it, leading to, at a minimum, the appearance of
non-meritorious decision-making.3 Similar problems exist in the Court's more
317
recent jurisprudence. In a more troublesome vein, and likely as a result of the
Court's inconsistent articulation and application of the doctrinal test, lower federal
court decisions now suffer from transparency concerns.
307. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
308. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180.
309. Id.
310. But see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979).
311. But see Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
312. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
313. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
314. The dissent acknowledges the problem, albeit stated slightly differently. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at
192* 93 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Our role, then, is not 'to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose expressed by a statute,' but to examine the text of what Congress enacted
into law .... Under the majority's reasoning, courts may expand liability as they, rather than Congress, see fit
.... By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the majority returns this Court to the days in
which it created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose. In doing so, the
majority substitutes its policy judgments for the bargains struck by Congress .").
315. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
316. In other contexts, the Court has stated that failing to follow procedure, without explaining the basis
for deviation, creates a perception of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. Nat. Cable & Tele. Ass'n. v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) ("Unexplained inconsistency is ... a reason for holding an
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change. "); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 548 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The law has also recognized that it is not so much a particular
set of substantive commands but rather it is a process, a process of learning through reasoned argument, that is
the antithesis of the arbitrary."); Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 792* 93 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("At the very least, due process requires that the relevant state decisionmaker listen to
the claimant and then apply the relevant criteria in reaching his decision. The failure to observe these
minimal procedural safeguards creates an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and erroneous deprivations.")
(citations omitted).
317. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457-58 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Because the Court's holding has no basis in the text of § 1981 and is not justified by principles of stare
decisis, I respectfully dissent . .. . It is unexceptional in our case law that statutory construction must begin
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose. Today, that rule is honored in the breach: The Court's analysis
of the statutory text does not appear until Part III of its opinion, and then only as a potential reason to depart




For purposes of this Article, I shall define transparency in the same manner that
Professor Luna has: "Transparency simply means the ability of the citizenry to
observe and scrutinize the substantive and procedural policy choices of
government, as well as their underlying rationales .. .. "318 In that vein, Professor
Luna has argued that transparency requires "not only visibility of policy choices but
a publicly declared rationale for these decisions."319 Using this standard as a metric,
lower federal court decisions are now potentially compromising the credibility of
the judiciary by issuing orders and opinions that lack supporting rationale. For
instance, in Fassina,320 the district court held that the Home Affordable
Modification Program ("HAMP") does not create an implied right of action.32 The
court's analysis, however, is limited to this statement:
[T]he Eleventh Circuit has held in an unpublished opinion that
HAMP ... does not provide borrowers with a private cause of
action .... The court finds the Eleventh Circuit's analysis of this issue,
while not binding, is persuasive and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit, as
well as the 'host of district courts' outside of this circuit that have
similarly concluded that HAMP does not contain a private cause of
action."'
In turn, Nelson, the Eleventh Circuit case on which Fassina relies, also contains no
analysis. Rather, the Court's entire analysis is composed of these two sentences:
This Court has not addressed in a published opinion the issue of whether
HAMP provides for a private right of action, but a host of district courts
that have done so have held that it does not. We agree with those courts,
and with the district court in the present case, that nothing express or
implied in HAMP gives borrowers a private right of action.32
And, the cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Nelson to support that summary
conclusion, contain equally summary conclusions. Thus, for instance, the analysis
in Cox is limited to the following: "There is no private right of action under HAMP.
Therefore, dismissal is warranted on this basis alone." 324 Similarly, the analysis in
318. See Luna, supra note 304, at 565. Similarly, Professor Hollander-Blumoff has argued that
transparency is a goal of procedural justice because it provides "parties . . . data to conclude that the
decisionmaking authorities and process are impartial." Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 285, at 157 . And,
Professor Tyler has argued that transparency is critical to procedural justice theory because it "foster[s] the
belief that decision-making procedures are neutral." Tyler, supra note 304, at 664.
319. Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1107, 1164 (2000).
320. Fassina v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV-2901-RDP, 2012 WL 2577608 (N.D. Ala. July 2, 2012).
321. See id., at *7.
322. See id. (citing Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 Fed. App'x 158, 159 (1lth Cir. 2011)).; see also
HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 09-01, INTRODUCTION OF THE
HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION 1 (Apr. 6, 2009), available at http://www.hppinc.org/_uls/resources/
SupplementalDirective_09-0.pdf..
323. Nelson, 446 Fed. App'x at 159 (citation omitted).
324. Cox v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (D. Minn. 2011) (citation
omitted).
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Melton is limited to this statement: "[I]t is well established that there is no private
cause of action under HAMP."3 25 Thus, in this chain of cases alone, one appellate
court case and no fewer than six district court cases effectively contain no
supporting rationale; stated differently, each of these cases is non-transparent. And,
this chain of cases is not an isolated incident. Rather, the problem is present in a
321
significant number of cases in the lower federal courts that involve the Doctrine,
leading to real problems with the perception of transparency.327 Thus, from the
perspective of Procedural Justice Theory, the Doctrine, at a minimum, gives rise to
the reasonable perception of non-merit-based decision-making. As a result, the
continued existence of the Doctrine has the potential to undermine the credibility of
the judicial system.
C. Evaluating Abolition in Light of Corrective Justice Theory
321Originally theorized by Aristotle, the concept of corrective justice is now
329
pervasive in the law, forming a normative justification for concepts in tort law,
criminal law, 3 0 equity, 331 and contract.332 At a basic level, corrective justice seeks
to correct an imbalance of loss and gain created by wrongdoing.333 Thus, at least to
some extent, Corrective Justice Theory is consonant with the Court's first statement
of the Doctrine: every harm deserves a remedy.3 34 While the humble beginnings of
the Doctrine were perhaps consistent with Corrective Justice Theory, the Theory no
longer forms a sound normative basis for maintaining the Doctrine for two reasons:
First, the doctrinal purpose underlying contemporary implied-rights jurisprudence is
inconsistent with Corrective Justice Theory. And, second, even assuming the first
325. Melton v. Suntrust Bank, 780 F. Supp. 2d 458, 459 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting Singh v. Wells Fargo
Bank, No. 1:1Ocvl659, 2011 WL 66167, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2011)). The remaining cases cited by the
Nelson court are either equally summary or are inapposite. See Hart v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 2d 741, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (wherein the entire analysis consists of the following: "There is no
express or implied right to sue fund recipients under TARP or HAMP."); Pantoja v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (inappropriately premising its conclusion on the
analysis in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421 (1988), a case that dealt with Bivens actions-an entirely
different jurisprudential line); see also Mosley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 802 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699 (E.D. Va.
2011) (where the court specifically states that the issue of a private right of action pursuant to HAMP is not
properly before it, as the plaintiff has not alleged it).
326. See cases cited supra note 240.
327. Admittedly, an easier course would be for lower courts to simply explain their reasoning. That
having been said, it would be difficult, given the current state of the law, to instruct the lower courts on the
test they should be applying. See generally Part II. B-C.
328. Michael 1. Krauss, "Retributive Damages" and the Death of Private Ordering, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNuMBRA 167, 170 n.18 (2010).
329. E.g., Norman L. Greene, Civil Conspiracy and the Rule of Law: 4 Proposal for Reappraisal and
Reform, 64 ARK. L. REV. 301, 324 (2011).
330. E.g., George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
51, 58 (1999).
331. E.g., Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WrLLAMETTE L. REv. 263, 276
(1996).
332. Id.
333. Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1876
(2011).
334. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 (1916).
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were not true, abolition of the Doctrine would have no impact on the application of
Corrective Justice Theory.
As to the former, the Court's current articulation of the Doctrine is inconsistent
with Corrective Justice Theory. The sole doctrinal purpose of the Doctrine is to
discern and breathe life into Congress' intent."' Thus, from the current doctrinal
perspective, the question is not whether or how to right wrongs or whether or how
to compensate victims. The question is simply: did Congress intend to generate an
implied right? Thus, Corrective Justice Theory is simply inapplicable to the
Doctrine as it currently exists.
Admittedly, that argument is self-fulfilling: once the Doctrine is defined within
contemporary notions of textualism, the doctrinal purpose is no longer to correct an
imbalance; rather, it is simply to achieve Congress' intent. Thus, through
definition, the Theory becomes inapposite. What potentially remains, then, is the
broader question of whether the Doctrine is normatively justifiable in a world where
its application is unconstrained by textualism."
Analyzing this question requires the bifurcation of two broad strands of
Corrective Justice Theory-Annulment Theory3m and Relational Theory. The
Annulment Theory of corrective justice was first posited by Professor Coleman.m
Professor Coleman's conception of Corrective Justice Theory uncoupled the
"wrong" from the "remedy" such that a wrong need not necessarily give rise to a
remedy specifically to the victim of the wrongful conduct.3 Rather, Professor
Coleman contended that corrective justice only required that either the unlawful
gain or loss be annulled or corrected in some respect;340 no particular mode of
rectification was required.3 4' Thus, for instance, criminal penalties "paid" to the
government were sufficient to rectify wrongdoing pursuant to the Annulment
Theory.342 Under this conception of corrective justice, abolition of the Doctrine
would generate neutral feedback. That is, some mechanism of enforcement
presumably exists for violation of any federal statute-whether it is enforcement by
the attorney general, an administrative agency, or a private citizen. Thus, so long as
some structural mechanism of enforcement exists, corrective justice is satisfied.
335. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).
336. Scholars have argued more expansive, liberalized frameworks were unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777, 860 (2004); James D.
Gordon 111, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
62, 66* 67 (2004); Michael J. Kaufman, A Little "Right" Musick: The Unconstitutional Judicial Creation of
Private Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 287, 290
(1994).
337. Coleman's annulment thesis is also referred to as an allocative theory. Curtis Bridgeman,
Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 3013, 3019 (2007).
338. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349
(1992). Several years after positing the Annulment Theory, Professor Coleman retreated from it and re-posited
the theory as a mixed theory. Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability ofLegal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697,
713* 14 (2005).
339. Coleman, supra note 338, at 358.
340. Id.
341. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS aND WRONGS 329 (1992).
342. Id.
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Annulment Theory has largely yielded to a relational conception of corrective
justice.343 Pursuant to the relational conception, both the wrongdoer and the victim
bear a relationship with one another such that once the wrongdoer commits the
wrongful conduct, the duty to rectify that wrong is coupled with the right of the
.344victim to receive compensation. Pursuant to this version of Corrective Justice
Theory, corrective justice is only satisfied once the wrongdoer disgorges the benefit
of the wrong to the victim and the victim receives that benefit.345
To unpack Relational Theory's application to abolition of the Doctrine, one
must first understand the concept of "wrongs" within Corrective Justice Theory.
Corrective Justice Theory does not define the concept of "wrong."3 46  Stated
differently, Corrective Justice Theory does not generate its own moral standard.3 47
Instead, the substantive component of Corrective Justice Theory is housed in its
normative aim for rectification of wrongs. The concept of "wrong," then, must
348derive from elsewhere. While attempting to define the concept of "wrong" and
discuss its origins is beyond the scope of this Article, it is safe-for purposes of this
Article-to divide all wrongs into three broad categories: First, there are statutory
wrongs that possess explicit mechanisms of private enforcement. Second, there are
wrongs that, given the current state of the law, can be privately remedied through
some action other than a federal, statutory enforcement mechanism.3 49 Finally, there
are wrongs that, at least given the current state of the law, could only possibly be
remedied by a private enforcement mechanism pursuant to application of the
Doctrine.
Initially, in terms of the first category, abolition of the Doctrine would have no
impact on Corrective Justice Theory, as an explicit, direct, private means of
enforcement would remain.3o Similarly, in terms of the second category, abolition
343. Bridgeman, supra note 337, at 3020* 22.
344. Id.
345. Id. Some theorists would posit that this statement is too broad. Specifically, some theorists argue
that compensation need not be paid directly from the wrongdoer to the victim. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra
note 338, at 772.
346. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961, 1047 n.164
(2001); Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory, 73
TENN. L. REv. 177, 178 (2006).
347. See Perry, supra note 346, at 178.
348. See id.
349. Although an administrative regulation, without more, is insufficient to give rise to a private right of
action in the positive sense, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001), for purposes of the
normative discussion in this Section, federal statutes and regulations shall be used interchangeably.
350. This, of course, presumes that the explicit enforcement mechanism would permit a full recovery for
the victim. To the extent the explicit enforcement mechanism prevented a full recovery to the victim, and
assuming the remedial scheme within the statute were exclusive, the existence and application of the Doctrine
would not change the result. Rather, the explicit text would control. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty.
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65* 66 (1992) ("As we have often stated, the question of what remedies are available
under a statute that provides a private right of action is 'analytically distinct' from the issue of whether such a
right exists in the first place. Thus, although we examine the text and history of a statute to determine whether
Congress intended to create a right of action, we presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless
Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. This principle has deep roots in our jurisprudence.") (citations
omitted). Inversely, assuming a cognizable right of action exists pursuant to a federal statute and assuming
Congress has not limited the remedies for violation of that implied right, then the federal courts have the
power to fashion any appropriate remedy. See, e.g., id. at 70* 71 ("The general rule, therefore, is that absent
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of the Doctrine would generate a neutral impact, as some mechanism of private
enforcement-or private correction-would remain even in the absence of a private
351
enforcement mechanism pursuant to a federal statute. Or, stated differently,
while relational corrective justice theorists couple the wrong with the remedyM no
relational corrective justice theorist has posited that the theory requires that the
victim of wrongdoing have a selection in the mechanism of recovery; rather, the
theory, at most, requires that the victim have the opportunity for recovery from the
wrongdoer. Accordingly, abolition of the Doctrine would, at most, remove one
avenue of recourse, while leaving one or more avenues of recourse untouched-a
result consistent with even the most expansive vision of corrective justice.
The final category-wrongs that lack any existing private remedy absent the
existence of the statute-presents an additional layer of complexity. Within this
category, a further delineation is necessary between wrongs that would not exist if
the statute did not exist ("Pure Statutory Wrongs") and wrongs that would exist
irrespective of the statute but would nonetheless be privately non-actionable if not
for the Doctrine ("Non-Actionable Wrongs").
In terms of Pure Statutory Wrongs, determining the effect of abolition creates a
circuitous analysis. Within the category, any claim of wrong brought pursuant to
the Doctrine is in fact legislative in nature. That is, if no statutory or constitutional
provision exists to prohibit or require conduct, then, at least for purposes of
applying the Doctrine, no wrongdoing could exist. Or, stated differently, the statute
both generates the wrong in the first instance and then, presuming the Doctrine is
applicable, provides a private remedy for its violation. In this category, abolition of
the Doctrine would have a neutral effect on the application of Corrective Justice
Theory, as, ultimately, congressional intent will be the keystone to the claims. To
explain this somewhat circular concept, we must envision a world both with the
Doctrine and a world without it.
In a world with the Doctrine-and assuming it existed in its most expansive
framework-the federal courts would provide a private remedy to those harmed by
a party's violation of a federal statute. This private remedy would exist irrespective
of whether Congress indicated an intent to create a private right-essentially we
would have reverted to a Rigsby... formulation. Even under Rigsby, though, the
power of the federal courts to generate implied rights, at least for Pure Statutory
Wrongs, was delimited by Congress' express statements.354 Thus, for instance, if
Congress were to create a Pure Statutory Wrong and then explicitly state (in the text
clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief
in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.").
351. Numerous examples exist. Thus, for instance, in the context of HAMP, while the federal courts have
held that HAMP does not create a private right of action, see, e.g., Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d
1113, 1116 (1lth Cir. 2012), many federal courts have permitted state law claims to proceed, even though
those state law claims were substantively premised upon violation of the regulations. See, e.g., Fletcher v.
OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (2011) (holding the plaintiff stated causes of action for breach
of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act).
352. See Sean Hannon Williams, Lost Life and Life Projects, 87 IND. L.J. 1745, 1767 (2012).
353. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
354. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 28 (1979).
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of the statute) that no private remedy existed for its violation, Congress' intent
would control."' And, to the extent the federal courts insisted upon creating an
implied right even as against explicit congressional will to the contrary, Congress
would always be free to eliminate the wrong-if Congress created the wrong,
Congress has the power to destroy it.35 In the absence of the wrong, Corrective
Justice Theory would not support a remedy.5 At bottom, application of Corrective
Justice Theory to Pure Statutory Wrongs in this hypothetical world would rest on
the intent of Congress, as Congress would possess the ability to craft Pure Statutory
Wrongs, explicitly limit them, and ultimately eliminate them. Effectively, then, this
hypothetical world has simply inverted the existing impetus: In the positive law,
Congress is charged with providing the impetus for a private right of action. In the
hypothetical world, courts are charged with providing the impetus for a private right
of action. But, in either world, congressional intent will nonetheless control; the
only true distinction is one of timing. Because the only differences between the two
worlds are impetus and timing, abolition of the Doctrine would have, at most,
nominal, non-substantive impact on the application of Corrective Justice Theory to
Pure Statutory Wrongs.
In the final category, Non-Actionable Wrongs, abolition of the Doctrine would
have no substantive impact. Before examining the impact of abolition on the
concept of Non-Actionable Wrongs, it is important to reiterate the definition. A
Non-Actionable Wrong within my framework is a wrong that: 1) exists independent
of any statutory creation; and 2) is only actionable with the application of the
Doctrine. It is relatively easy to envision wrongs that exist independent of statutory
creation; the common law is, after all, rife with them. But, common law civil
wrongs are, by the nature of their impetus, privately actionable. That is, common
law civil wrongs exist because they were created by courts as a result of parties
invoking the civil process. Thus, common law civil wrongs are not Non-
Actionable Wrongs. Furthermore, common law criminal wrongs-at least ones that
harm individual people in a manner that would give rise to pecuniary damages-
always have a private, civil law analog.359 Accordingly, common law criminal
355. See id.
356. Admittedly, one could imagine a world where Congress lacked the ability to legislatively override
these decisions by the federal courts. And, that hypothetical world may, in some circumstances, better serve
Corrective Justice Theory. Nevertheless, that hypothetical world would require a completely different
constitutional system. In that vein, the hypotheticals in this Article presume the existing constitutional system
is a constant.
357. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, & Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46
VAND. L. REV. 561, 606 (1993).
358. It is, of course, possible that a court could generate an actionable common law civil wrong that was
subsequently eliminated by the legislature. While presumably rare, this does not modify the analysis-as
discussed in the section regarding Pure Statutory Wrongs, this circumstance, while perhaps cumbersome for
Corrective Justice Theory, is nonetheless consistent with the extant constitutional system.
359. Thus, for example, the civil law analog of robbery consists, at a minimum, of assault. Compare 77
C.J.S. Robbery § 127 (2012) (stating the elements of the Bank Robbery Act require a showing of violence or
intimidation), with 6A C.J.S. Assault § 4 (2012) (stating a civil cause of action for assault requires an
apprehension of harm). And, in a related vein, some civil law analogs maintain the same names. For
instance, the civil law analog of battery is battery. Compare 6A C.J.S. Assault § 84 (2012) (stating a criminal
battery requires proof a touching for a wrongful purpose), with 6A C.J.S. Assault § 8 (2012) (stating civil
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wrongs are always actionable and also fall outside the definition of Non-Actionable
Wrongs. The only potentially remaining category of wrongs, then, consists of a
360cohort of as-of-yet undefined wrongs.
In theorizing about the possibility of these as-of-yet undefined wrongs, it is not
difficult to imagine that wrongs, albeit currently undefined wrongs, exist. After all,
every existing wrong, whether at common law or by statute, had to be created at
some point. And, it is not difficult to imagine, notwithstanding the lack of
recognition in the law, that these wrongs have even been identified; the process of
recognizing wrongs-from identification to recognition-is sometimes slow.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that this cohort of wrongs, once definitely
identified, would be recognized in a manner that would place them beyond one of
the previous definitions. More specifically, it is difficult to imagine that new
wrongs would be identified and recognized through some mechanism other than the
common law or statutory creation. Accordingly, assuming these theoretically
possible Non-Actionable Wrongs exist, abolition of the Doctrine would generate
the same impact seen in the other, previous categories-none. As a result, abolition
of the Doctrine would have no impact on the application of Corrective Justice
Theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, both scholars and the judiciary have been operating on the
unexamined assumption that implied rights of action provide some normative
utility. This Article argues that assumption is flawed for three reasons. First, an
assessment of the Doctrine's beneficial value yields, at best, a nominal result, as the
Doctrine only generates beneficial value in remote, isolated circumstances.
Accordingly, abolition of the Doctrine would not eviscerate any real value.
Nevertheless, and second, the Doctrine does give rise to negative ramifications
within the fabric of the law. Specifically, the Doctrine does generate judicial waste
and does generate judicial decisions that, at a minimum, raise the specter of non-
merit-based decision-making. Finally, the Doctrine's abolition would have a
neutral impact on corrective justice principles, as the positive articulation of the
Doctrine is inconsistent with principles of corrective justice, and even if that were
not true, abolition would not eliminate avenues of redress that did not otherwise
legitimately exist. Accordingly, the Doctrine should be abolished.
battery requires an intentional touching that is offensive and wrongful). This statement should not be
construed, however, to say that all criminal prohibitions are actionable in civil law. Rather, it is to say that all
criminal prohibitions that cause pecuniary harm to a victim have a corresponding civil law action.
360. In attempting to imagine what remains, one could easily raise the issue of constitutional wrongs-
violations of a person's constitutional rights for instance. But, the ability to sue the government exists at its
own affirmative leisure by virtue of extant constitutional systems. E.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,
227 (1882) ("It is an established principle of jurisprudence, in all civilized nations, that the sovereign cannot
be sued in its own courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission. . . ."). As indicated above, this
Article presumes the constitutional structures will remain constant. Thus, the continued existence-or
abolition-of the Doctrine has no substantive effect on those actions.
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